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Throughout history states have pursued both 
cooperative and power-oriented strategies. Moralists and 
realists have long questioned the appropriateness of using 
force to gain state objectives. Recent analysts have 
stressed that states have a moral duty to manage 
international uncertainty in the best interests of their 
citizens. While this might involve utilizing both 
power-seeking and order-seeking strategies, it has been 
suggested that pursuing order-seeking strategies could help 
alleviate international uncertainty. 
2 
An historical survey, as well as recent case studies 
in Grenada and Nicaragua, indicate that the United States 
often has relied upon military strategies in the Caribbean 
Basin. The United States has employed a variety of 
techniques including "shows-of-force," threats, coercive 
diplomacy, intervention, and covert activities. These 
policies appear to have been based upon the assumption that 
military policies can be carefully calculated to alter the 
behavior of another state. Due to classified information, 
sensitive information is often restricted regarding this 
topic. However, available information indicates that 
American foreign policy regarding the use of force in the 
Caribbean Basin has not been useful. 
While such policies may appear to have been successful 
in the short run, the same policies often have brought 
negative repercussions in the long run. Not only has the 
United States been regarded unfavorably, but it has been 
portrayed as a nation which only observes international law 
when it is convenient to do so. Further, international 
uncertainty has often been exacerbated by U.S. actions. 
Also, it is not clear that such military strategies always 
have been carefully designed~ and even if they were, such 
policies would not be completely predictable. The United 
States needs to design new foreign policy strategies, relying 
less upon military force. 
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You must know there are two ways of contesting, 
the one by the law, the other by force ••• because 
the first is frequently not sufficient, it is 
necessary to have recourse to the second. 
Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince 
An international order cannot be based on power 
alone for the simple reason that mankind will 
in the long run always revolt against naked power. 
An international order presupposes a substantial 
measure of general consent. 
E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis 
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CHAPTER I 
THE UTILITY OF FORCE 
In spite of pronouncements regarding the necessity for 
international law and order, the United States as well as 
other nations have continued to rely upon force in the inter-
national arena. Incidents in the 1980s, as in the Falklands, 
Grenada, Lebanon, Libya, and Nicaragua reveal that violence 
and the threat of violence have remained as state strategies 
in international politics. Such calculated plans have rep-
resented attempts "to influence the course of international 
developments in a desired manner.• 1 
However, the unpredictability of both the inter-
national environment and of the military strategies make 
it imperative to reexamine the assumptions regarding the 
necessity for force as well as the utility of present 
military policies. Questions--ranging from moral objections 
to pragmatic considerations--have arisen regarding the appro-
priateness of using force to obtain state objectives. An 
overview of U.S. military strategies in the Caribbean Basin 
with emphasis on the Nicaraguan situation reveals the 
problems of the U.S. military policies, both from a pragmatic 
and moral or philosophical point of view; furthermore, such a 
study reveals the need to develop alternatives to military 
strategies. 
REEXAMINATION OF HISTORICAL ASSUMPTIONS 
Need and Utility 
There have been times the need and utility of military 
force have been questioned. During such periods states have 
' attempted to maintain peaceful international relations with 
each other. For example, in 1814-1815, after the era of 
Napoleon, the Congress of Vienna attempted to formulate 
treaties that would create a roore stable order in Europe. 
And, the Holy Alliance, by stressing the value of a ruler 
acting as a Christian toward his subjects and other rulers, 
also attempted to create a more positive international 
environment. 
However, in spite of efforts at cooperation, states 
have often resorted to force to achieve their goals. As 
Machiavelli pointed out, if lawful behaviors do not achieve 
desired goals, it may be necessary for the state to employ 
force. 2 And E. H. Carr has emphasized that in the early 
nineteenth century Karl Maria von Clausewitz, attempting to 
advance Prussian interests, emphasized the legitimacy of 
force by stating: " ••• war is nothing but the continuation 
of political relations by other means.•3 As character-
ized by Ziegler, Bismarck followed Clausewitz's dictum "that 
war is a useful instrument of policy" and believed that: 
2 
" .•• it is not by speeches and resolutions that the great 
questions of the time are decided ••• but by iron and 
blood. 114 Bismarck's successful military experiences with 
Prussia and the unification of Germany reinforced the idea 
that war is a useful policy. Prussian battle deaths were 
low in comparison to the enemy; and the wars did not seem 
disruptive to the economic and political structure in the 
home country because the wars were so rapid. 5 
Strategy of Force 
Methods of force and concepts regarding its use have 
also varied during historical periods. While force has 
undoubtedly been used at times as a threat, force often has 
been associated with war, with brute force being used to 
achieve specific goals. States have used forceful methods 
3 
to acquire territory, to create or consolidate a political 
order, to defeat an enemy, or to acquire position or wealth 
in the international system--above all, force was used 
because "states expected to benefit from its use and from the 
new distributions they expected after it had been used." 6 
Moralist and Realist Arguments 
Viewpoints regarding the appropriateness of force have 
been most of ten presented from a moralist or realist perspec-
tive. Certain broad concepts have tended over time to 
characterize these terms. 
Moralists have argued that forceful acts need to be 
judged in accordance with higher religious or moral law. 7 
4 
Like individuals, states are expected to comply with this 
higher standard. Moralists believe that cooperation and 
observance of international law will facilitate this 
compliance and promote order and peace within the 
international community. Moralists recognize that states and 
their rulers do not behave according to moral standards, but 
they believe "they ought to do so" and that it is the duty 
of leaders to create an international environment in which 
they will achieve this aim. 8 The moralist position can be 
further refined by differentiating between a moral, or 
ethical perfectionist, and a non-perfectionist moralist. 
According to Arnold Wolfers a moral perfectionist would 
consider whether the end justifies the means and would 
conclude that "no matter how noble and virtuous the end, it 
never justifies the use of means that violate moral/ethical 
standards." 9 However, a non-perfectionist moralist would 
judge an act upon both the ethical standard of behavior and 
upon the specific context within which the act is 
performed.lo Therefore, a non-perfectionist moralist 
would agree "in condoning the acts of those who kill in 
self-defense."11 
Rather than asking whether policies are in accord with 
abstract moral principles, realists would evaluate a policy 
by its political consequences. 12 In particular, realists 
would consider how a policy would affect the power of the 
nation. Realists stress that no state recognizes an 
authority higher than itself, and there is no international 
agency capable of maintaining order. This results in an 
anarchic international environment which is characterized by 
5 
insecure state relationships. It has been argued that states 
not only fear losing their national sovereignty and 
territorial boundaries in such an environment, but that 
states of ten deliberately seek to increase their power in 
such a situation. In such an anarchic environment, it has 
been suggested by moralists that states need to make policies 
which will protect their national sovereignty and territory. 
However, realists have not considered states to be bound by 
the same moral principles as individuals. In fact, according 
to Morgenthau • ••• the state has no right to let its moral 
disapprobation ••• get in the way of successful political 
action.•13 E.H. Carr has agreed: •In the international 
order, the role of power is greater and that of morality 
less.•14 To these realists the criterion to be applied in 
choosing methods is not their morality but rather their 
effeciency. 15 However, some realists still feel obliged 
to respect the moral standards of others, for they realize 
that to be completely ruthless can create strong opposition 
and set back their cause.16 
6 
REEXAMINATION OF RECENT ASSUMPTIONS 
Need and Utility Reconsidered 
As in other historical periods, states in the twentieth 
century have sought to emphasize cooperation in the 
international environment. The League of Nations, the United 
Nations, the emphasis on international law, and the continued 
theorizing concerning possible philosophical/moral approaches 
to foreign policy all testify to the search for more peaceful 
approaches to international relations. 
Yet, in the twentieth century the threat or use of 
violence has circumscribed international politics. It can be 
argued that international law actually legitimizes military 
force by such concepts as sovereignty, self-help, self-
defense or retaliation. The World Wars, Korean and Vietnam 
wars are not only examples of violence, but unlike Bismarck's 
Prussian victories, they have proven to be disruptive, 
lengthy, and costly. 17 The threat of nuclear destruction 
has also affected attitudes regarding the usefulness of 
force. While it can be argued that it would be possible to 
survive (or even •win") a nuclear war, the dangers of using 
nuclear weapons also has been emphasized. The employment of 
advanced military capabilities has come to be regarded as 
self-destructive1 the fear exists that even limited violence 
could escalate. Still, threats and military confrontations 
continue. 
In the 1980s the world has experienced a remilitariza-
tion of international relations, with an emphasis on the use 
of limited physical coercion as a means of achieving 
b . . l8 d l' 'l't t t . o )ect1ves. Repeate re lance upon m1 1 ary s ra eg1es 
in Nicaragua, Grenada, and Libya illustrate the perception 
that the application of limited military force is useful to 
achieve goals. And the Soviet actions in Afghanistan are an 
indication that other powers are employing military 
strategies in attempting to achieve their goals also. 
Revised Strategy of Force 
In historical periods, force often had been associated 
with brute force or war, but in recent years it has been 
argued that "plain war has now been replaced" by a more 
refined use of force. 19 Limited force has become regarded 
as a projection of state power to establish and maintain 
control over other states. 20 In particular, limited force 
has become viewed as a method to control other states by 
affecting their attitudes, expectations, and resolve. 21 
Therefore, the military power of a country is not only 
measured by its destructive capability, but by its capacity 
to influence the behavior of another country. A limited 
7 
military action can be viewed as a technique of influence, as 
a means to political objectives, with states being affected 
by the threat of force. The strategy of using or threatening 
force is based on the assumption that the opponent state will 
alter its behavior Cif force can alter it at all) because it 
fears or expects more violence will be used against it if it 
does not alter its behavior. 22 
A whole range of policies has been devised based upon 
the assumption that limited violence is useful to project 
state power to alter the behavior of other states. In 
devising these plans, the term strategy has come to be used 
interchangeably with the term policy. 23 Specifically, 
strategies can be defined as "the art of distributing and 
applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy.• 24 
8 
The term strategy also implies that a state's military 
policies represent "calculated, coherent plans" designed "to 
influence the course of international developments in a 
desired manner.• 25 Such influence strategies include 
displays or shows of force, military force specifically 
designed to communicate, influence or coerce, as well as 
actual use of mlitary force, as in interventions. Also, if 
economic pressure, propaganda, subversion and diplomacy are 
combined with force, then they too may be considered as 
strategic policies. 26 Another form of strategic 
policymaking has been referred to as "coercive diplomacy." 
Coercive diplomacy refers to a situation where force has been 
used specifically as a method of communication to induce the 
opponent to revise his calculations or behavior. 27 
In recent years, there has been a shift in emphasis 
regarding the usefulness and strategies of force. 28 While 
nuclear war may be feared, limited war and threats of war can 
9 
be viewed " as techniques of influence, not of destruction1 
of coercion and deterrence, not of conquest and defense1 of 
bargaining and intimidation.• 29 Military action, then, 
would not be viewed as an alternative to bargaining, but as a 
process of communication, influence, bargaining, and 
coercion. 
Moralist and Realist Arguments 
There is still controversy between those who are 
regarded as moralists and realists. However, recent 
theorizing has further refined conceptual thinking regarding 
this topic. Recent political analysts have argued that the 
moralist-realist framework is no longer adequate, that its 
dichotomy of views which polarize power and cooperation has 
over-simplified matters. 
New Conceptualizations 
A recent criticism has been directed at the realist 
emphasis upon competition and power-seeking as the main 
motivation of state behavior. 30 Recent work by Snidal has 
emphasized that there is a basic flaw in the realist emphasis 
upon the state as a power-seeking actor. Rather, both 
competition and cooperation should be considered as an 
integral aspect of state behavior. States will collaborate 
when it is in their interest to do so. States do not just 
act in their own immediate self-interest, but are guided by 
the concept of •strategic rationality.• This philosophy 
10 
takes into account the possible reactions of other states, as 
well as the pursuit of immediate state interests. Specif-
ically, taking into consideration the long term reactions of 
other states could act as a modifying effect upon state 
behavior: the incentive not to cooperate on a given issue 
would be mitigated by the fear that non-cooperation by one 
state would lead to later, non-cooperative behavior by other 
states. If policies are devised from the viewpoint of this 
nstrategic rationalityn a more cooperative pattern of inter-
action could replace the traditional anarchic aspect of the 
international scene. 
Other analysts have also argued that analyzing 
international relations from a moralistic-realist perspective 
is inadequate. Scott and Carr have argued that the state is 
not subject to moral principles while involved in policy-
making. 31 Therefore, in evaluating foreign policy actions, 
nit is something of a category mistake to think that the 
principles of a universal ethic are relevant to foreign 
policy making.• 32 However, the state must conduct policy-
making in an anarchical international environment. Due to 
this situation, the state does have •a moral obligation to 
their own citizenry.•33 Specifically, the state has the 
duty to manage international uncertainty for its citizens. A 
state will be more successful in accomplishing this aim by 
adopting a policy which makes selective use of both 
power-seeking and order-seeking policies. Power-seeking 
' 
policies continue to be used because: "Order-seeking 
strategies cannot overcome the dilemma of international 
distrust.• 34 Further, given the state of the international 
11 
environment, it would be unrealistic to expect or even "hope 
for the worldwide emergence of brotherly love.• 35 Yet, 
while state reliance upon its own power may seem to ensure 
its security from the threat of other states, power-seeking 
may exacerbate the very problem it is attempting to manage. 
Power-seeking by one state may increase power-seeking 
strategies in other states. 36 Therefore, states need to be 
guided by the concept of "strategic consequentialism." 
Following such a concept would mean that "power-seeking and 
order-seeking moves would be strategically selected according 
to their likely consequences for the security and well-being 
of the state Cits citizens) initiating the action.• 37 In 
order for policies to be effective, a wide range of options 
must be considered1 and strategies need to be calcuated and 
recalculated to be certain the desired effect is sustained. 
It is necessary for the state to know "when a power-seeking 
or an order-seeking strategy will pay the greatest dividends 
on any particular issue.• 38 Further, failure to utilize a 
"strategic- consequentialist" approach would imply that many 
policy options actually would not be considered, or that 
options might have been circumvented by premature 
actions. 39 To develop truly useful policies, the state 
must be aware of the possible ramifications of many 
12 
strategies, as well as the effect of various state actions 
upon other states within the international system. Only if a 
state follows such an approach can the state develop success-
ful strategies and effectively represent its citizens. 
Recent analysts would argue, then, that force ought to 
be avoided if possible, but that various situations may 
warrant or even necessitate the use of force. This does not 
mean that force is advocated. In fact, avoiding violence in 
the international arena could serve both moral and pragmatic 
purposes. Also, these analysts warn that gains incurred by 
force in the short run can cause problems in the foreseeable 
future. While resolution of a problem by force might seem to 
affect the opponent state only, in the long run all states 
will be affected by an arbitrary and unstable inernational 
system. 
Need for Further Reexamination 
Recent theorizing suggests that older conceptual 
frameworks are inadequate and that further investigation of 
"strategic rationality" or "strategic consequentialism" would 
be beneficial to understand the working of the international 
system, and of the U.S. role within that system. As noted, 
it is only by analysis and recalculation that effective state 
policies can be devised for the benefit of that state's 
citizens. 
An examination of U.S. policies in the Caribbean Basin 
is particularly useful for evaluating military policies, 
13 
since the United States has relied upon military strategies 
so often in this area. Also, viewing U.S. policies in the 
Caribbean Basin allows military strategies to be analyzed 
from a broad perspective. Policies can be evaluated in 
relationship to their effect upon specific states, to the 
whole region, and from the region to the entire international 
system. Local, regional, and global contexts are all impor-
tant. 40 Emphasis upon a broad setting also helps to 
emphasize that states are actors which are part of an inter-
national arena, an environment providing various constraints 
on state actions. While the United States may have the 
military power to influence states to achieve short-term 
goals, an examination of such policies may indicate that 
military strategies may not be in the long-run best interest 
of the United States. 
---~, 
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EXAMINATION OF U. S. FOREIGN POLICIES 
AND THE USE OF FORCE IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN 
The term Caribbean Basin refers to the Central American 
Isthmus and Maritime Caribbean nations. 1 Therefore, this 
area is: 
Bounded by the Bahamas in the north and Barbados 
to the east, the Caribbean is one vast natural 
chain commanding the Atlantic-Pacific and north-
south trade routes. Guyana and Belize are 
already traditionally viewed as Caribbean states 
but so, too, are Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, 
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colu~ia, Venezuela, 
Suriname, Mexico and French Guiana. 
EARLY SOURCES OF THE REGION'S PROBLEMS 
In order to analyze and recalculate U.S. policies in 
the Caribbean Basin, it is necessary to have an effective 
understanding of the region itself. It is clear from 
numerous historical examples that the United States has 
intervened often in the Caribbean Basin. Yet, U.S. policies 
of force have not seemed to significantly alter the problems 
of the region, and these military strategies have required 
repeated employment by the United States. Furthermore, 
responding to each isolated occurance has not been very 
helpful: •something systemic is going on and, until the 
19 
syndrome is diagnosed, treating each isolated recurrence will 
get us nowhere.• 3 
Part of the difficulty in correctly assessing the 
region's problems stems from the individual features of each 
nation. A variety of relationships between the elite, the 
government, and the peasants exists due to differing histor-
ical, geographic, or social conditions. 4 For example, the 
societies of various countries reflect the cultures of the 
colonizing counries--the English in Belize, the French in 
Haiti, or the Spanish and U.S. influence in Puerto Rico. 
Yet most analysts would agree that there are common 
historical roots to the region's problems. Colonialism is a 
factor that the Caribbean nations had in common. In general, 
the native populations were displaced from their lands by the 
colonizers. Plantations developed with coffee, bananas, and 
sugar predominating as the major export crops. It has been 
argued that the coffee production developed a more dominant 
oligarchy which relied more strongly upon the military to 
prevent reforms (such as land redistribution) and a conse-
quent loss of the colonizer's power. 5 However, the sugar, 
banana, and other business owners also resisted reforms and 
maintained extensive control over all aspects of the 
Caribbean countries6 It has been agreed generally that 
these large companies and owners operated in their own 
interest, making •only a limited contribution" to a country's 
development. 7 During this period of time, the Caribbean 
Basin area was subordinated to European interests. The 
well-being of the region's economy relied upon exports and 
was therefore vulnerable to outside forces. The native 
20 
populations suffered, and declined in members. For example, 
it has been estimated that after fifty years of conquest, the 
Indian population of El Salvador declined from as many as 
500,000 to about 75,000. 8 African slaves were brought into 
many areas with the consequence that colonialism even altered 
the ethnic structure of the societies. It has been estimated 
that from 1450-1888, some ten million Africans were captured 
and transported to the Caribbean area. 9 
The inequitable conditions created by colonialism have 
contributed to the present-day political instability of the 
Caribbean Basin. 10 The exploration, conquest, coloniza-
tion, slavery, the export economy, the racial and ethnic 
admixture have all contributed to the problems of the present 
day--including poverty, unemployment, underdevelopment, 
economic dependency, social rivalries, ethnic animosities, 
weak identity, and political disunity. 11 
U. S. RESPONSES TO THE REGION'S PROBLEMS 
Instability and weakness in the Caribbean Basin has led 
to intervention in its affairs by many countries, including 
the United States. While the United States has suggested or 
helped to implement reform measures, or has extended economic 
aid, over time the United States has also employed a variety 
21 
of military strategies in the Caribbean Basin. U.S. military 
influence attempts have included shows of force, especially 
naval ones. Threats, both implicit and explicit, also have 
been made to Caribbean Basin states. When threats or other 
military signals have failed to alter the behavior of states 
in a desired fashion, the United States often has resorted to 
invasion. Other military strategies have also been employed. 
For example, coercive diplomacy was employed in both the 
Cuban Missile Crisis and the use of covert activities in 
Nicaragua. While the United States has worked with inter-
national or regional organizations, it is clear from these 
historical examples that the United States will resort 
ultimately to military strategies if this seems the best way 
to achieve its objectives. 
Ad Hoc Responses 
In spite of its close proximity to the Caribbean 
Basin, the United States has often been preoccupied with 
other matters with the consequence that policymakers have 
directed varying degrees of attention to this area. For 
example, at the time the area of the Caribbean Basin was 
being colonized by European powers, the United States was 
involved in establishing its own independence and in expand-
ing its own frontiers. Further settlement, continuing 
efforts to develop industrialization, as well as internal 
political matters all consumed much American energy. However, 
over time, the United States policymakers directed more 
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attention to the Caribbean. Yet, U.S. policies have been 
further complicated by the individual preferences of key 
policymakers, as with Teddy Roosevelt's emphasis on the •big 
stick" in contrast to Jimmy carter's insistence on observing 
human rights. 
U.S. Early Involvement 
Changing Perceptions. Regardless of the lack of a 
long term formalized policy, U.S. policymakers gradually 
became more cognizant of the Caribbean Basin (and, in fact, 
of all Latin America). In the early 1800s U.S. attention 
was drawn to the Caribbean as several Caribbean Basin 
colonies acquired their independence. For example, Haiti 
declared its independence in 1804 (and France agreed to this 
in 1825); and in 1821 Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala 
each declared their independence. However, newly gained 
independence did not bring freedom from the interference of 
other countries. 
Even though the United States was involved with its own 
internal affairs, U.S. policymakers continued to become aware 
of the importance of the Caribbean Basin. Thomas Jefferson 
stated, for example, that it was essential to "our tran-
quility and commerce ••• " to consider this area under general 
. fl 12 U.S. in uence. In 1823 the Monroe Doctrine was 
proclaimed, with the declared purpose to limit European--but 
not American--interference in the Western hemisphere. 
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In spite of the Monroe Doctrine, it has been argued 
that "the United States did not really become involved in the 
Caribbean Basin area until after the Spanish-American 
War.•13 This war can be viewed as the event which drew the 
United States into a series of interventions in the Caribbean 
and Latin America--thereby drawing the United States into 
world politics. 14 In support of this argument, it can be 
noted that U.S. influence increased following 1898. For 
example, in 1898 Puerto Rico became a U.S. possession1 the 
Spanish were driven out of Cuba, with Cuba created as a U.S. 
protectorate in 1903, and placed under U.S. military 
occupation for four years. Also, in 1903, the United States 
was involved in supporting Panama in its secession from 
Colombia. In fact, in order to support its preferred 
policies, the United States had militarily intervened in the 
Panamanian area thirteen times by 1903. 15 Not only had the 
U.S. embarked upon a course of interventions, but by the 
early twentieth century, the United States had become "the 
hegemonic military, political, and economic power in the 
region.• 16 
By 1904, Theodore Roosevelt had announced his corollary 
to the Monroe Doctrine, that "the United States would be 
responsible for the conduct of Latin American governments,• 
whether or not they had any ties to any foreign powers.17 
During this period of Roosevelt's "big stick• approach to 
international relations, U.S. policy came to mean more than 
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merely preventing foreign intervention~ rather, the idea 
developed that the United States would have the respon-
sibility to exercise "international police power" to correct 
"any deficiencies in the internal character of Latin American 
regimes that might encourage foreign intrusion.•18 
At the time of the Corollary, political and economic 
instability were perceived to be the threats of particular 
concern. 19 The United States responded to various 
instabilities in a variety of ways, including threats, 
interventions, and the drawing up of treaties--often made at 
gunpoint. 2° For example, in 1906 political instability 
occurred in Guatemala, leading to a full scale war between 
Guatemala and El Salvador. This led President Theodore 
Roosevelt to send the U.S. warship Marblehead to the coast 
of El Salvador. The extent of U.S. influence is clearly 
demonstrated by the fact that the cease-fire between 
El Salvador and Guatemala was signed on board the 
Marblehead~ and when the cease-fire threatened to disin-
tegrate into war in 1907, the United States again intervened 
militarily. 21 
Dollar and Gunboat Diplomacy. While Theodore 
Roosevelt's administration emphasized u.s. military action, 
it has been argued that during the next few years William 
Howard Taft "replaced bullets with dollars in his policy 
toward the region.• 22 Taft's emphasis on furthering the 
U.S. economic interests has often caused this period of 
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American foreign policy to be referred to as •dollar 
diplomacy.• The United States continued to expand its 
commercial interests in the Caribbean Basin area. Americans, 
for example, consolidated sugar interests in Cuba, the 
Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico. 
However, the •use of military force was never, in fact, 
totally abandoned.• 23 While the United States may have 
tried to avoid using military strategies for political 
purposes, nevertheless U.S. force was often used to protect 
American economic interests. 24 As a result of the threat 
or use of threat, other scholars have referred to such U.S. 
military strategies as •gunboat diplomacy.• 25 Such pol-
icies have not been restricted to a particular historical 
period, but continue to the present. 
Security interests. During World War I the United 
States continued to respond to perceived security problems. 
For example, after the building of the Panama Canal, Haiti 
was considered to have considerable strategic value; •the 
sixty-mile stretch of water between Haiti and Cuba was part 
of the only direct water link between the eastern coast of 
the United States and the Panama Cana1.• 26 Political 
instability occurred in Haiti, but United States marines also 
invaded Haiti in 1915 •as part of a general plan for the 
strategic and economic control of the Caribbean region.•27 
Once a new government was in place, and U.S. influence seemed 
assured, then the policy of the U.S. administration primarily 
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stressed Haitian strict debt repayments to ensure a positive 
economic environment for U.S. investors. 28 In order to 
facilitate this goal, the U.S. marines assumed management of 
the customs houses and established martial law. 29 Military 
bases in other areas also assumed greater importance during 
the war years, as Guantanamo in Cuba or Chaguaranas in 
Trinidad. In 1917 •to forestall the possibility of Germany 
constructing a naval base on the Virgin Island of St. John, 
the United States purchased the island from Denmark, along 
with St. Croix, part of St. Martin and St. Thomas.• 30 And, 
in the 1920s, the U.S. government was also concerned about 
the risk of security in Mexico due to "Bolshevik 
influences.• 31 
Many other examples of U.S. military policies can be 
cited. For example, U.S. marines invaded Cuba in 1917 and 
stayed until 1923 •putting down strikes and protecting United 
States property.• 32 The United States also occupied the 
Dominican Republic from 1916 until 1924, establishing martial 
law and a U.S. military government. 33 In fact, between 
1898 and 1920, U.S. troops landed in the Central American 
region twenty times. 34 
Evaluation of U.S. Early Involvement. As noted, 
inequitable conditions created by colonialism have 
contributed to instability and poverty in the Caribbean 
Basin. The United States has often responded to events or 
conditions in this area with military strategies. These 
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strategies may have seemed to serve the immediate goals of 
the United States--such as as maintaining political order or 
providing a favorable economic climate for U.S. investments. 
However, over a period of time the seemingly successful use 
of military force caused other problems. For example, in 
Haiti the United States marines imposed martial law in 1915 
to ensure a stable environment. Yet, a growing nationalist 
movement opposed this action, leading to a demand for the 
withdrawal of U.S. troops which was agreed to in 1934. 35 
Also, these various military poiicies contributed to a 
negative perception regarding the United States. It has 
been argued that a negative attitude toward the United States 
is a •permanent factor• in areas of the Caribbean1 36 and 
that past U.S. military policies now mean that •political 
change in Central America will likely entail no small dose 
of Anti-Yankee sentiment.• 37 This anti-Yankee sentiment 
has recently been expressed by Daniel Oduber, the past 
president of Costa Rica. In 1985 Oduber wrote that average 
Central Americans feel as if they are dominated and threat-
ened by •armed thugs1• these thugs are •not the Leninist 
commissars but the armed sergeants trained by the United 
States.• 38 
Therefore, early U.S. responses to the Caribbean Basin 
proved inadequate. Lasting international order was not 
achieved1 the region's problems persisted1 and U.S. military 
actions created a negative perception toward the United 
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States. Unfortunately, the United States still pursued such 
actions through the next decades. 
Temporary Restraints 
After World War I the United States had again 
emphasized world trade and U.S. investments. The United 
Fruit company expanded, becoming a powerful force within the 
Caribbean region. For example, by the 1930s, the United 
Fruit Company had become the largest landholder, employer, 
and exporter in Guatemala. 39 In fact, the United Fruit 
company became known as •El Pulpo,• The Octopus, and emerged 
as a •formidable foreign political influence in the 
region.• 40 Americans also became involved in oil in 
Trinidad, bauxite in Jamaica and Guyana, and in manufacturing 
and tourism in various areas. Many of the Caribbean Basin 
countries continued to have political instability, and the 
United States again often responded to problems by choosing 
military strategies. 
However, the stock market crash of 1929 preoccupied 
Americans, causing a temporary restraining effect on U.S. 
military policies. 
Great Depression. The Great Depression caused 
worldwide social and political stress, which included the 
Caribbean Basin. For example, El Salvador had profited from 
a successful coffee industry, with coffee earnings having 
produced 95.5% of export profits, funded central and local 
government, financed internal development (roads, ports, 
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railroads), and created employment or even fortunes for many 
individuals. 41 However, the worldwide depression sent 
coffee prices downward1 thousands of peasants had no work, 
with even the wealthy suffering. Political repercussions 
followed. Indian uprisings occurred, and worker's revolts 
erupted in the cities. In 1930, August!n Farabundo Mart! 
returned to El Salvador. In March, 1930, he founded the 
Salvadoran Communist Party. He, and other leaders, planned 
an armed revolt. Eventually, the El Salvadoran army executed 
Mart! and as many as 30,000 Salvadorans. 42 
At other periods the United States may have been more 
likely to have intervened in El Salvador. However, at a time 
when the United States was preoccupied with its own problems, 
the oligarchs within the country had responded to this 
growing unrest with repression. 43 Still, even though the 
United States did not actually intervene, it did provide a 
"show-of-force." During the rebellion, the United States 
supported the goverment by stationing two destroyers and a 
naval cruiser carrying Marines off the coast of El Salvador1 
and the U.S. Marine Air Groups stationed in Nicaragua were 
also alerted. 44 
Good Neighbor Policy. Although the "Good Neighbor 
Policy" is popularly associated with Franklin Roosevelt (who 
used the term in his inaugural address), President Hoover had 
previously initiated the policy. In Argentina Hoover prom-
ised to abstain from intervention in the internal affairs of 
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the nations south of the border, and he arranged to remove 
U.S. troops from Haiti and Nicaragua. Hoover even formally 
repudiatd the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. 
Evaluation of U.S. policies. Analysts have disagreed 
over U.S. military restraint shown during this period. It 
has been argued that this shift in U.S. policy was not due to 
economic or military weakness, but was the result •of moral 
inhibitions.• 45 Other analysts have stated that in prac-
tice the •Good Neighbor Policy• simply meant the abandonment 
of international entanglements at a time the United States 
was •preoccupied with economic matters.• 46 For example, 
the United States had previously intervened in Nicaragua to 
ensure the second term of Adolfo Diaz. Rather than inter-
preting the withdrawal of the marines as a moralistic action, 
it can be argued also that when the U.S. marines proved 
unable to capture Sandino, they were withdrawn (January 
1933>. 47 
Even if the United States may have been somewhat 
restrained by moral inhibitions or practical considerations 
during the time of the •Good Neighbor Policy,• the United 
States presence remained dominant in the Caribbean Basin and 
the United States still resorted to military strategies. 
•shows-of-force• were still designed to influence the 
behavior of other countries--as in Cuba, in the 1930s, when 
30 warships were sta~ioned around the island to protect 
. . t t 48 American in eres s. 
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World War II and Strategic Imeratives 
With the U.S. involvement in World War II the United 
States once again had less time for intervention in the 
Caribbean Basin countries. However, the United States 
recognized the strategic importance of the area. During the 
war years, the u.s. military presence in the Caribbean 
increased. Expanded military installations were constructed 
in Panama, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands1 bases were 
also set up in Trinidad, Barbados, St. Lucia, and British 
Guiana. 
Panama Canal and Defense Treaties. The Panama Canal 
was regarded as particularly strategic. In 1936 the United 
States had signed a General Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation, 49 and had relinquished the right to unilateral 
intervention in Panama's political affairs. However, that 
treaty did allow the United States to obtain access to 
additional lands and waters relating to the defense and 
modernization of the canal. And in 1942, the U.S. Panama 
Base Convention50 was signed, allowing the United States 
over 100 new military and telecommunications facilities in 
Panama. 
As well as increasing attention to the Panama Canal 
Zone, the United States took other steps to increase its 
security. In 1947 the United States and the nations of Latin 
America completed the Rio Treaty. 51 Security was 
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emphasized by the phrase in which the parties agreed that •an 
armed attack by any State against an American State shall be 
considered as an attack against all the American States,• and 
consequently, each one of the states agreed to aiding the 
attacked state. 52 The Rio treaty was soon followed by the 
creation of the Organization of American States53 in 
Bogota, Colombia, in 1948. While the OAS provided for state 
security, it also established guidelines for hemispheric con-
duct whch ruled out intervention by one state in the affairs 
of another. 
Evaluation of U.S. Policies. It has been argued that 
it is the duty of a state to manage international uncertainty 
in the best interests of its citizens. While it may have 
been the intent of the U.S. policymakers to achieve this 
goal, U.S. strategies have not accomplished this. Previous 
U.S. military interferences in Panama had negative effects 
upon the U.S.-Panamanian relationship even during the time 
of war. For example, Arnulfo Arias was elected as President 
of Panama in 1940 on a platform which emphasized strong 
•anti-Yankee nationalism.• 54 Although he was overthrown 
the next year--when he resisted U.S. pressure for more mil-
itary bases during World War II--his ideas and anti-Yankee 
sentiment remained popular. He was so popular, in fact, that 
he was reelected in 1949 (although again removed by a coup in 
1951). Furthermore, during the World War II period, 
Panamanian nationalism erupted in repeated riots in reaction 
to the United States demands for more bases to defend the 
Canal.SS And, finally, in 1947, mass protests prevented 
an agreement to increase the U.S. military presence in 
Panama. 56 
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The past--and continuing--u.s. military presence in 
Panama still negatively affects the U.S.-Panamanian rela-
tionship. The United States initial involvement in the 
establishment of the Panamanian state and its subsequent 
military (as well as economic and political) influence in 
Panama has resulted in Panama's resentment toward the United 
States. Many examples can be cited to indicate the resent-
ment. For example, in 1964 anger against U.S. authorities 
Cwho had restrained Panamanian students from positioning 
their national flag beside a U.S. flag at a high school in 
the Canal Zone) resulted in 30,000 Panamanians demonstrating 
in the streets of Panama City. By the time the riots ended, 
the physical damage exceeded $2 million; 28 deaths had 
occurred, and 300 more were wounded. Panama's resentment 
toward the United States in regard to the ownership and 
operation of the Canal itself has abated somewhat. In 1977 
the United States and Panama finally reached an agreement 
regarding the Canal, with the United States retaining the 
right •to manage and operate the canal until the year 2000,• 
and with the United States having •perpetual authority• to 
use its military •to protect and defend the cana1•--as well 
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as having "the perpetual right to build a new sea-level canal 
ten miles to the west." 57 
Yet, there is resentment concerning some of the terms 
of the treaty58 and concerning the continuing U.S. presence 
in the area. For example, the United States continues to 
control the School of Americas military training center. It 
is possible that such issues "related to the continuing 
U.S. military presence could mobilize national resentment 
• w59 again. 
The Panama Canal and the treaty systems established in 
the 1940s have continued to be important to the United 
States; and the Caribbean Basin countries no doubt hoped the 
OAS Charter would involve a new relationship with the United 
States. The OAS Charter could be viewed as a step toward 
less military intervention by the United States: 
For the first time it seemed to free them (the 
Latins) from the fear of the big stick which had 
been applied against them so often in the past. 
For the United States, as well, it was a radical 
break with the past, a final and explicit repudiation 
of 'gunboat diplomacy' and a recognition that the 
Monroe Doctrine could no longer be used as an excuse 
for unilateral interventions desigg0d to punish or intimidate recalcitrant States. 
However, the treaty systems did not lead to less military 
interference from the United States. As the Soviet Union and 
communism became an ever-increasing worry, the tension 
between the Soviet Union and the United States evolved into 
the Cold War. And, the heightened tension between the 
superpowers coincided with a new instability among the 
political governments of the Caribbean Basin area. 
Cold War Influences 
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During the Cold War period, U.S. policies particularly 
emphasized the necessity of maintaining control over the 
Caribbean Basin; it was considered essential for U.S. welfare 
to exclude the left from power. In fact, keeping the left 
from power was defined "as furthering U.S. national 
interest"61 and viewed as preventing potential military 
threats. During this time it was a consistent policy 
assumption that the United States must prevent leftist 
movements from becoming leftist governments, for communist 
success in one country would provide a platform for the 
revolution to spread to the next country (domino theory>. 62 
If U.S. diplomatic efforts or development efforts failed to 
provide the necessary stability in the Caribbean Basin, then 
the United States relied upon military force, as can be 
demonstrated by events in Guatemala, Cuba, and the Dominican 
Republic. 
Guatemala. Guatemala in the 1950s represented an area 
which was affected by Cold War perceptions. Reforms had been 
attempted by the government of Jacobo Arbenz which could be 
interpreted as long needed restitution of economic inequal-
ities or which could be viewed as extreme socialistic/Marxist 
programs that threatened democracy in Guatemala. It can be 
argued that the promise of Arbenz to reform the economy of 
36 
the country was not totally revolutionary1 yet such reform 
effort "inevitably meant" confronting the large U.S. corpora-
tions in Guatemala, notably United Fruit, International 
Railways of Central America, and Electric Bond and Share 
Company. 63 In 1953 and early 1954 the government began a 
land reform program, expropriating over a thousand estates 
and distributing this land to over 100,000 families. 64 The 
Guatemalan government also expropriated 387,000 acres of land 
from the United Fruit Company. 65 These reforms seemed 
extreme to many. When Arbenz then legalized the Communist 
Party the new government seemed even more radical. Communist 
involvement in the Arbenz government was in actuality limited 
to a "small number of Communists" in "low-level cabinet 
positions." 66 Further, the Arbenz government can be viewed 
as "an elected government" which was attempting to carry out 
"a program of indiginous economic and political liberaliza-
tions. "67 However, the reform actions of Guatemala were 
viewed from a Cold War perspective: "The United States 
government had determined that communism should not gain a 
foothold in this hemisphere." 68 In 1954, the U.S. govern-
ment stated it feared the growth of communist power in 
Guatemala, and the United States pressured several reluctant 
delegations to secure passage of a key resolution at the 
Tenth Inter-American Conference (held at Caracas, 1954). 69 
The resolution declared that the domination or control of the 
political institutions of any American state by the 
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international communist movement would endanger the peace and 
security of the hemisphere, and would necessitate a meeting 
of consultation to recommmend appropriate measures. Such a 
meeting was proposed soon after the resolution was approved, 
but before the meeting could be assembled the Guatemalan 
government was overthrown by u.s.-supported forces. 70 
Once again, the United States had resorted to military 
strategies. 71 President Eisenhower had authorized a coup 
in Guatemala. Financial resources were provided to begin 
covert action against Arbenz. The CIA also supported an 
exile army in Honduras and Nicaragua and persuaded ex-Colonel 
Castillo Armas Ca right-wing Guatemalan military member) to 
lead these forces. The CIA then established a small air 
force in Nicaragua and the Panama Canal Zone to support 
Armas's invasion by bombing Guatemalan cities. These planes 
were piloted by U.S. Navy airmen who reportedly served as 
mercenaries. The communist threat seemed removed; Arbenz was 
forced from Guatemala to Mexico; and Armas took power; and 
all expropriated land was returned to the United Fruit 
Company. 
Events in Guatemala seemed to demonstrate the utility 
of American military policies. Lloyd Etheredge has argued: 
•Eisenhower, and other politicians, learned 
that covert operations were a useful method for 
cold war interventions in underdeveloped countries. 
After the Guatemala success, the role of CIA 
covert ac;~vities in American foreign policy 
expanded. 
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In fact, Etheredge has claimed that the policymakers 
perception of U.S. strategic success in Guatemala led to 
the eventual shaping of the plans for the Bay of Pigs 
. . 73 invasion. 
Cuba. Cuba represented another area which was 
affected by Cold War attitudes. In Cuba, once again seeking 
to achieve political stability, the United States had 
supported Fulgencio Batista. The United States operated on 
the assumption that a strong government, backed by the 
military, was the most capable of preventing the emergence 
of a communist government. 74 However, the Cuban revolution 
occurred in 1959, with Fidel Castro, a self-proclaimed 
Marxist, succeeding to power. Cuba turned increasingly to 
the Soviet Union for assistance. 
President Eisenhower responded to this situation by 
endorsing the supplying of arms to counter-revolutionaries 
within Cuba. At this time, •the CIA was working closely with 
Cuban exiles in Florida who carried out acts of sabotage and 
even bomb attacks on Cuba from the air.• 75 As Castro 
continued to further his relationship with the Soviet Union, 
Eisenhower endorsed a CIA recommendation" to begin to train 
and arm Cuban exiles for an invasion,• with Guatemala being 
used as a base for these operations. 76 
It was actually in 1961, during the Kennedy 
Administration, that the Bay of Pigs invasion occurred. An 
invasion force of 1,400 men was assembled, with the Cuban 
underground and American Air Force planning to assist the 
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ex-Batista supporters and mercenaries. 77 Due to the extent 
of u.s. support for this invasion, this has been referred to 
" t . . • 78 as a CIA surroga e 1nvas1on. The Bay of Pigs was 
unsuccessful and a humiliating experience for U.S. 
policymakers. 
The United States once again confronted the Soviets and 
the Cubans during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. 79 In 
October, 1962, U.S. policymakers considered a range of 
policies to deal with the missiles that U-2 photos revealed 
the Soviets were placing in Cuba. Peaceful options, such as 
working through the OAS or through negotiators were rejected, 
being considered either ineffective or so slow-moving that 
the missiles would be operational by the time discussions and 
debates were completed. Extreme military actions as conduct-
ing an invasion or mounting an air strike were finally elim-
inated as useful strategies. Choosing these options, for 
example, would involve killing Soviet advisors and techni-
cians as well as Cubans, and would engender a greater risk of 
mlitary confrontation with the Soviets. 
The option finally selected--a naval quarantine--was a 
military strategy that the United States hoped would be 
effective. First, the policy was stated by President Kennedy 
on nationwide television. Kennedy clearly explained (and 
continued to repeat over the next days) the American posi-
tion. The Soviet Union was expected to dismantle the mis-
siles (which the United States regarded as offensive rather 
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than defensive> and Soviet ships would not be allowed to pass 
thorugh the naval quarantine if they were carrying missiles 
or other equipment which would make partially developed 
missiles operational. 
To make the threat of using force seem more believable 
to Khruschev, Kennedy backed his words with actions. To 
emphasize American determination military aircraft were 
orderd to bases within striking distance of Cuba. Almost 200 
naval ships were gathered into a task force, and 200,000 men 
were placed on alert status. 80 
Eventually, the Soviet Union did agree to dismantle the 
missiles. In return, the United States guaranteed it would 
not invade Cuba. 
Dominican Republic. The United States had previously 
intervened in this area many times. For example, the United 
States had occupied the Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924, 
with Dominican affairs administered directly by the U.S. 
military government. 81 In 1930, Rafael Trujillo Molina 
seized power in a revolt and was elected president later that 
year. He then ruled as dictator for thirty-one years. 
During the Trujillo years the United States had no need 
to intervene. Trujillo kept tight control over the country, 
both politically and economically (even controlling an 
estimated 65-85% of the country's economic wealth>.82 
However, Trujillo was assassinated in 1961. 
41 
After the assassination the next few years were 
characterized by unrest. Trujillo's assets came under state 
control following his death, and the new President Juan Bosch 
resisted pressures to denationalize Trujillo's property. Fur-
ther, he "sought to limit the power of foreign capital and 
local landowners while def ending the rights of the 
peasantry." 83 
Evidence exists that the United States, becoming 
alarmed at the situation in the Dominican Republic, lent 
support to Bosch's opposition. In October 1963 Bosch was 
overthrown, and it has been suggested that the leader of the 
coup was conditionally supported by Kennedy. 84 Further, 
the new head of government was Donald Reid Cabral who was 
reputed to be a local CIA agent. 85 Bosch was successful in 
regaining his power in a coup in April 1965, but this led to 
the CIA immediately attempting to set up an alternative junta 
under Colonel Benoit. Hearings before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee later in the year revealed that on 
April 28 there was: 
••• a cabled request from Benoit to US Ambassador 
Bennett for American troops 'because a Communist 
takeover threatens'. But U.S. intelligence reports 
had stated that same day that no more than two of 
the 'prime leaders of the rebel forces (were men) 
with a long history of Communist association.' 
Ambassador Bennett then informed Benoit that 
American troops could only be brought in if the 
justification became the need to protect 
American lives. Benoit's second cable read: 
'Regarding my earlier request, I wish86o add that American lives are in danger ••• • 
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It would appear that Benoit's cable provided the 
justification for a direct U.S. policy of using force. That 
same day the United States ordered 400 marines from bases in 
the Caribbean to the Dominican Republic; later, a further 
20,000 U.S. marines were sent by President Johnson to deal 
with the communist threat. 
On May 2, 1965 the president proclaimed what soon 
became known as the Johnson Doctrine: 
Revolution in any country is a matter for that 
country to deal with. It becomes a matter for 
hemispheric action only when the object is8;he establishment of a Communist dictatorship. 
In a nationwide broadcast, President Johnson emphasized the 
need for hemispheric security by stating: "The American 
nations cannot, must not, and will not permit the estab-
lishment of another communist government in the Western 
· h n88 Hemisp ere. 
The U.S. invasion had immediate results. Juan Bosch, 
who had been democratically elected in 1963, was prevented 
from returning to power. A year after the U.S. invasion, an 
election was held between Juan Bosch and Joazuin Baluger, who 
was supported by the United States. After Baluger was 
elected, the remaining U.S. troops were withdrawn. 
Evaluation of U.S. Policies. As has been documented, 
during this early Cold War period the United States demon-
strated that it would use military strategies when they 
seemed useful. In one respect, the policies employed by the 
United States in the Caribbean Basin seemed successful. 
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Reform movements that might have furthered communism were 
halted in Guatemala and the Dominican Republic while Cuban 
and Soviet military influence was limited by the Soviet 
agreement to withdraw its missiles from Cuba. Still, aspects 
of u.s. actions suggested problems with these policies. 
In Guatemala a U.S. approved order was restored, but 
unrest has remained. As previously noted, poverty and 
inequality are the real sources of instability; therefore, 
imposed order that does not address these problems is only 
temporary. 89 There is a clear need for reform in 
Guatemala. For instance, •in Guatemala the top two percent 
of the population receives 25 percent of the income, while 
the bottom 50 percent receives from 10 to 15 percent.• 90 
Yet those who would advocate change have been labeled as 
•communists• by the military and oligarchy. 91 In fact, 
•since the fall of Arbenz, elections and reformist parties 
have meant little in terms of fundamental change.• 92 
Unfortunately, the United States has aided in the suppression 
of reform by its support of the military and oligarchy. 93 
Furthermore, the U.S. interference and sponsorship of polit-
ical violence has severely damaged the Guatemalan political 
system itself. 94 Testimony before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee in 1967 indicated that the U.S.-aided 
alliance between the military and oligarchy did •1ittle to 
improve military respect for civilian authority and constitu-
tional processes.• 95 
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It would appear that the fear of communism in Guatemala 
may have limited certain political choices. It has been sug-
gested that pursuing a course of "strategic consequentialism" 
is the most effective way of managing international uncer-
tainty and that policy options must be constantly recalcu-
lated in order to achieve the most effective U.S. action. 
Yet, events in Guatemala suggest that "once Arbenz had been 
perceived as a communist the die was cast" and he must be 
stopped. 96 Such a response to communism and reforms may 
prevent other useful options from being selected. In 1967 
Senator Fulbright suggested that American foreign policy 
needed to be more effective and realistic: 
American interests are better served by supporting 
nationalism than by opposing communism, and when 
the two are encountered in close association it 
it in our interest to accept a communist govern-
ment, rather than to undertake the cruel and all 
but impossible tas~ 7 of suppressing a genuinely national movement. 
In dealing with Cuban problems, U.S. policies regarding 
the Bay of Pigs invasion seem clearly non-utilitarian; 
strategies during the Cuban Missile Crisis can be interpreted 
as more useful. 
The CIA sponsored covert activities and the Bay of Pigs 
invasion were not successful. For example, the underground 
networks supported by the CIA and disaffected Cubans "were 
almost always" infiltrated by Castro supporters1 supplies of 
munitions sent to Cuba were "frequently intercepted;" 
clandestine cells were "not well organized;" and teams sent 
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to Cuba to infiltrate Cuban groups were wpicked upw within a 
h . 98 s ort time. Further, the American-supported bombing 
raids in Cuba have been characterized as having wno obvious 
effect" except "to increase the rate of executions" of the 
suspected anti-Castro Cubans. 99 In fact, in spite of 
covert policies, Castro's regime "not only survivedw but his 
"influence appeared to grow."lOO The Bay of Pigs invasion 
was so unsuccessful that one analyst wrote Kennedy had "been 
thoroughly defeated by Castro on the beaches in 1961 ••• "lOl 
Numerous problems occurred during the invasion itself. Flaws 
concerning the military operations included incomplete or 
inaccurate information regarding the location of reefs or 
microwave radio stations, the dependence on untested new 
outboard motors, the utilization of impractical landing 
craft, and the lack of an effective back-up communication 
102 system. 
Policymakers specifically have been criticized 
regarding their choice of the entire general strategy. They 
have been charged with using poor judgment in thinking that 
previously successful Guatemalan covert policies could be 
altered and applied to seemingly similar covert actions in 
Cuba. 103 It has been pointed out that even in Guatemala 
the U.S. military plan only succeeded by a narrow margin; and 
in Guatemala u.s.-supported forces only had to contend with a 
limited military force loyal to Arbenz while the Castro 
forces numbered over 200,00o. 104 Policymakers have also 
been criticized for failing to consider fully the possible 
consequences of an unsuccessful invasion: •Kennedy and his 
advisers did not consider the implications of a prolonged 
struggle that might have embroiled the United States had 
Kennedy not inadvertently scuttled his own operation.•105 
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•The missile crisis deliberations showed that a marked 
improvement in the policy process could occur.•106 
In the CUban Missile Crisis a wide range of options was 
considered, finally resulting in the choice of a naval 
blockade. Analysts tend to describe U.S. military policies 
in this incident as •successful,• since the blockade did 
achieve the objective of limiting Soviet power in the 
Caribbean area at that time, and this was accomplished 
without resorting to actual warfare. 107 
It can be argued that international relations involves 
a degree of risk-taking and that a state might deliberately 
choose such a policy to represent the interests of its 
citizens. However, U.S. policies during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis did involve high risk-taking as well as the threat of 
escalation: 
If the Cuban blockade had failed, there were 
few remaining options that President Kennedy 
could have used without triggering war. Efforts 
by strategists and civilian leaders to transform 
force into a highly refined, discriminating 
instrument that will support an assertive foreign 
policy and also be appropriate for crisis manfij§-
ment eventually break down if pushed too far. 
---i 
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The fear of communism also motivated the United States 
to intervene in the Dominican Republic. Like the U.S. inter-
vention in Guatemala, this U.S. military action •sent a 
signal throughout Latin America that the United States was 
more comfortable with military governments than with 
democratically elected reformist governments.•109 To many 
states it appeared the United States would be prepared to 
intervene with military force if perceived U.S. interests 
seemed "sufficiently threatened.•110 Inter-American 
treaties--with their accompanying declarations--are quoted by 
the United States if they can be made applicable to justify 
U.S. actions1 otherwise, these international agreements are 
. 1 d' d d 111 s1mp y isregar e • 
As a result of perceived U.S. successes in these 
confrontations and the continuing fear of communism, U.S. 
policymakers continued to rely upon military strategies in 
the Caribbean area. 112 For example, in the 1960s the canal 
Zone became a center for training in counter-insurgency 
techniques, and •by 1971 military investment in the Canal 
Zone was estimated to be $U.S. 4,800 million.•113 And, 
when guerilla groups appeared in Guatemala and Nicaragua in 
the early 1960s, the United States responded with •operation 
Brotherhood," a series of naval exercises, designed to 
discourage any more political instability. 
In 1964 the United States encouraged the establishment 
of the Central American Defense Council CCONDECA). Although 
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the United States still maintained a military presence in the 
region, the establishment of CONDECA indicated the American 
preference for employing national and neighboring armed 
forces to protect U.S. interests rather than sending in 
. ld' 114 American so iers. The United States experience in 
Vietnam would reinforce this preference. 
Vietnam Influence 
During the latter years of the Johnson administration, 
Vietnam consumed official Washington's attention. During the 
Nixon administration the Vietnam experience influenced the 
American decision-makers' perspectives regarding inter-
national relations, including views of the Caribbean Basin. 
In particular, American policies continued to stress military 
security, rather than economic development and reform in the 
. bb . 115 Cari ean Basin area. 
There were several developments in the Caribbean that 
seemed disturbing to U.S. decision-makers. The •domino 
theory" was subscribed to by many; just as the United States 
had to worry about the "domino theory" in Southeast Asia, 
many U.S. State Department spokesmen worried about countries 
in the Caribbean becoming communist and therefore creating a 
"sea of splashing dominoes" in that area. 116 During the 
1960s and 1970s many countries in the Caribbean Basin had 
become independent (in the 1960s--Jamaica, Trinidad, Tobago, 
Guyana and Barbados, and in the 1970s--Bahamas, Grenada, 
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Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Suriname). However, as 
in other historical periods, independence did not bring about 
social or political transformation of these areas. Political 
and social inequalities continued to exist. Further, Cuba 
demonstrated an interest in promoting socialist policies and 
governments in the Caribbean, a fact which concerned the 
United States. 117 For example, Guyana's government had 
moved toward socialism1 in 1973, Castro visited Georgetown, 
and Guyana appeared to have a very radical government. 
Jamaica also seemed to be leaning toward radicalism. Michael 
Manley had come to off ice in 1972 and Jamaica proceded to 
embark upon socialistic reforms. In Grenada, in March 1979, 
an insurrection was launched and the government of Eric Gairy 
was replaced by a government under Maurice Bishop which 
preceded to forge links with the Cubans and Soviets. Other 
new governments established during the 1970s, as St. Lucia 
and St. Vincent, also stressed reform and socialistic 
measures. Since these new governments appeared within months 
of the Grenadian revolution of 1979 it might have seemed as 
if the Cuban experience would promote communism in other 
areas. 
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands also claimed U.S. 
attention during this time. Puerto Rico had been a 
self-governing "Commonwealth" since 1950, associated with the 
United States. However, by 1975, Puerto Rico had serious 
problems. For example, "seventy per cent of the population 
was sufficiently impoverished to be eligible for U.S. food 
coupons." 118 Theoretically Puerto Rico had internal 
so 
political independence, but questions regarding the colonial 
nature of the relationship of Puerto Rico to the United 
States were being raised in the international community. For 
example, in 1972 Cuba brought the Puerto Rican issue to the 
U.N. Committee on Decolonization. "The United States denied 
that Puerto Rico was a colony and maintained that the issue 
was an 'internal' one of no concern to the international 
community." 119 Yet, in 1978, a U.N. resolution by the 
Decolonization Committee stressed that "only through a 
complete transfer of power from the United States to the 
people of Puerto Rico could the latter be able to decide 
freely its political future," and the committee asked the 
United States to present a plan providing for the future 
political independence of the island. 120 However, the 
United States government has stressed support for statehood 
rather than for independence. 121 In the case of the Virgin 
Islands, they were bought by the United States from Denmark 
in 1917, and these islands have a similar relationship to the 
United States with the exception that there is less internal 
autonomy than in Puerto Rico. Although these areas have been 
of concern to the United States (especially with recent 
terrorist activities), the United States has chosen to rely 
1 . . h h 'l't 122 on po ic1es ot er t an m1 i ary ones. 
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The U.S. experiences in Vietnam emphasized the problems 
of relying upon military strategies. Various analysts began 
to challenge the past U.S. policies of military force in the 
Caribbean Basin. For example, Zbigniew Brzezinski argued 
that the United States should review its priorities, partic-
ularly the hard stand on anti-communism and hemispheric 
security. 123 In 1974, the Commission on United States-
Latin American Relations which was headed by Sol Linowitz, 
recommended that the United States abandon military inter-
vention as a weapon of hegemonic assertion. Specifically, 
Linowitz argued that the United States should "keep local and 
regional conflicts outside the context of the super power 
relationship," and should not regard all conflict as battle-
grounds of the cold war. 124 The Commission did, however, 
retain the traditional view that "Cuba was a special problem" 
to the United States, requiring U.S. policies aimed at 
t . . b 125 res ra1n1ng cu a. 
Alternatives to Force in the Caribbean Basin 
The United States has not only relied upon military 
strategies in the Caribbean Basin; rather, U.S. policies 
reflect a mixture of ad hoc responses to perceived 
problems. 126 At various times U.S. policies have stressed 
being a "Good Neighbor" as well as the threats of coercive 
diplomacy or the actual force of intervention. 
The "Good Neighbor" policy and general attempts to 
promote reform have already been discussed. However, during 
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the 1960s and 1970s two alternative attempts to U.S. military 
strategies are particularly noteworthy--the Alliance for 
Progress and the emphasis on human rights as developed by 
Carter. 
Alliance for Progress. Recognizing the problems of 
inequality and the need for reform, President Kennedy 
announced the Alliance for Progress. The United States 
pledged twenty billion dollars in aid for Latin America. 
Government officials announced that the United States hoped 
to help eliminate the problems that caused nations of the 
Caribbean area to turn toward communism. And, the Alliance 
for Progress did give impetus to reform groups--popular 
associations and new political parties that sought the kinds 
of revisions that the Alliance had promoted. 127 However, 
the Alliance failed to produce "the enduring political and 
economic reforms" that had been proposed. This was partly 
due to the fact that U.S. policymakers seriously under-
estimated the entrenched power and the tenacious resilience 
of the traditional upper classes to resist sharing their 
. 'l 128 privi eges. 
Although government officials emphasized the Alliance 
for Progress as an alternative to military strategies, "the 
Alliance also included a military security component designed 
to def eat any revolutionary challenge that might preempt or 
disrupt attempts at reform." 129 For example, the School of 
the Americas was utilized as a military training center for 
t 
. 130 coun er1nsurgency measures. Also, the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (AID) was established1 regional 
police forces were provided with training and supplies--
including general arms, antiriot guns, communications and 
t t t . . t 131 ranspor a ion equ1pmen • 
Emphasis on Human Rights. Questions regarding the 
appropriateness and effectiveness of military strategies 
regarding foreign policy were raised toward the end of the 
Kissinger-Ford era, but especially during the Carter 
Administration. 132 The carter administration directed more 
attention, skilled officials, and aid to the Caribbean than 
previous adminstrations had1 and developed the concept that 
the United States should be willing to tolerate a degree of 
ideological pluralism in the region. 133 The idea was ad-
vanced that it was to the U.S. advantage to avoid military 
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strategies, stressing instead human rights. "Although 
applied with some inconsistency, the advocacy of human rights 
regained for the United States some of the respect among 
centrist and democratic forces which had been lost in the 
wake of its Vietnam and Chile experiences.•134 The U.S. 
emphasis on human rights (in spite of inconsistent policies) 
promoted the development of a political center in the 
Caribbean area while encouraging needed reforms. 135 For a 
time it seemed these new policies promised the inauguration 
of an era of friendly cooperative relations between 
states. 136 However, during Carter's term in office there 
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was a change in foreign policy. Liberal policies were 
replaced by more conservative ones. 
Several international events reinforced the worries 
of American decision-makers. The Soviets had invaded 
Afghanistan. Iran had captured the American embassy, taking 
American hostages. And, in 1978, Cuba had sent troops to 
Ethiopia which not only brought an end to the slow process 
of normalization that had been developing in the United 
States-Cuban relations, but reinforced U.S. anxieties about 
Soviet-Cuban military intentions in the Third World. 137 
The United States worried also about the presence of "MIG 23 
attack aircraft which could conceivably carry nuclear 
weapons" and about the presence of Soviet combat brigades in 
Cuba. 138 Despite Soviet and Cuban reassurances, a further 
decline in United States-Cuban relations occurred. 139 
Then, in 1979 the Nicaraguan revolution added further 
concerns for American foreign policy. 
The view came to be stressed that "Communism was the 
principal danger facing the world" and that "its spread 
should be resisted." 14° Further, Cuba was regarded as a 
surrogate of Moscow, responding to Soviet directions. The 
United States primarily relied on military measures to deal 
with the perceived problem of Communist influence in the 
Caribbean. A view developed that Carter's earlier approach 
had focused too much upon constraints and limits regarding 
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American actions; instead, "there ought to be greater efforts 
to project American power abroad in order to achieve a 
tighter grip on global political developments." 141 In 
fact, Communism ought to be resisted by the United States 
"with all means at its disposal." 142 The renewed emphasis 
on military strategy included the decision to set up a new 
Caribbean Joint Task Force Headquarters in Key West, Florida, 
and to expand the U.S. naval maneuvers in the Caribbean. 143 
American warships were seen more frequently in the area, 
participating in shows of force like "Operation Solid Shield 
80;" this exercise occurred in May 1980, involving more than 
20,000 men and 42 naval vessels. 144 
Conservative Comeback 
When President Reagan took off ice in 1981 he brought 
with him "a deeply ingrained Cold War perspective of 
inter-American relations." 145 This is particularly evident 
in his view of Nicaragua. Carter policy had initially seemed 
to pursue policies aimed at cooperation rather than confron-
tation .146 However, the Reagan Administration would bring 
an end to this approach. The Sandinista movement in 
Nicaragua was regarded as a Cuban inspired revolution. In 
fact, with the Sandinista success Nicaragua was regarded by 
many in the Administration as "lost;" El Salvador and 
Guatemala were viewed as "endangered;" Mexico was 
"threatened;" and ultimately the United States--as "the last 
domino"--would also be endangerea. 147 This concern for 
security from Cuban inspired revolutions affected the 
perceptions of the United States regarding the Caribbean 
Basin area. It is, in fact, significant that the Reagan 
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Administraiton "drew no distinction between the Caribbean and 
Central America," but referred to the area by a newer 
concept, the Caribbean Basin. 148 Some analysts have argued 
the small areas of this region really have little in common 
beyond their close proximity to the United States "but were 
forced together by the administration's determination to 
reassert U.S. hegemony in the area and expunge Cuban 
influence for good."149 
As a result of its concern over Cuban initiatives the 
United States developed several poliicies to restrain Cuban 
influence, including anti-Cuban broadcasts, and economic and 
diplomatic efforts to reward or punish Caribbean states which 
seemed too socialist or reformist1 but the United States 
continued to rely on military policies also. 
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GRENADA AND U.S. POLICIES 
The Reagan Administration's concerns regarding the 
spread of communism are demonstrated by the Administration's 
reactions to events in Grenada. Policymakers in the United 
States regarded the new developments in the Grenadian 
political situation as threatening, as providing an area from 
which growing commuunist influence could spread to other 
areas in the Caribbean Basin. The U.S. policymakers 
responded to this situation by consciously designing options 
to signal U.S. concern and U.S. determination to halt any 
further communist developments. Specific military strategies 
were designed to influence and coerce Grenada into altering 
its state behavior so that it would be regarded as more 
acceptable by the United States. When influence strategies 
failed to alter Grenada's state behavior, the United States 
resorted to direct intervention. 
POLITICAL BACKGROUND 
Grenada, having been discovered by Spain and ruled by 
Britain for two hundred years, became independent in 1974. 1 




had American and British support. However, Grenada faced 
many problems at this time. In 1975 Grenada was one of the 
poorer countries in the Western Hemisphere, having a per 
capita income of U.S. $390. Further, the economy was not 
well balanced, being dependent on export products of bananas, 
cocoa, and spices. Even more problems developed during the 
Gairy administration. Agriculture for local consumption 
slumped to the degree that Grenada had to begin importing 
most of its food, and unemployment increased (estimates range 
from 20% to a rate of 50% of unemployment). Tourism 
declined; the balance of payments deficit increased; and 
political tensions on the island increased. 
On March 13, 1979, Gairy's government was overthrown by 
an almost bloodless coup. The leader of the coup was Maurice 
Bishop, and his party was called the New Jewel Movement. 
Shortly after the coup, Bishop declared a socialist 
democratic and nationalist program of reform. Bishop's 
program included upgrading education, increasing food 
production for local consumption, encouraging limited 
tourism, reform of the bureaucracy, and the building of a new 
airport. However, Bishop and his new program--with its 
stress on socialist reform--seemed communist. This communist 
involvement seemed further evidenced when Bishop invited 
Cuban military advisors to Grenada. He also increasingly 
utilized Marxian socialist terms such as "people's militia." 
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The new Grenadian government faced opposition from other 
pro-American governments in the Caribbean. They reacted with 
hostility to the new government, with the premier of St. 
Vincent going so far as to ask Britain to send troops to 
overthrow the new government. 2 
However, even within Grenada there was controversy 
regarding Bishop. 3 There were factions--those who favored 
a broadly social democratic emphasis and those who were 
committed to Marxism and "the eventual socialist trans-
formation of society." To the latter group, it did not 
appear that Bishop was moving fast enough toward Marxism--
especially since Bishop appealed to both capitalist and 
socialist countries for aid. At issue also was the 
increasingly autocratic style of Bishop's leadership. 
As a result of political dissension within the New 
Jewel Movement, Bishop was placed under house arrest on 
October 13, 1983. Protests grew regarding Bishop's arrest 
and after a large demonstration on October 19, he was 
temporarily freed. However, he was later executed on the 
same day. 
In reaction to this act, the United States took strong 
military action. However, the Reagan Administration's 
opposition to the revolutionary regime in Grenada had long 
been evident. 4 
U.S. POLICY RESPONSES 
Viewing the new Bishop government with alarm, U.S. 
policymakers attempted to communicate U.S. displeasure with 
Grenada's socialistic measures. For example, the American 
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ambassador Frank Ortiz informed Bishop that the United States 
would "view with displeasure any tendency on the part of 
Grenada to develop closer ties with Cuba." 5 As noted, 
while Bishop did make some accomodating moves toward the 
United States (such as requesting U.S. aid) the Grenadian 
government continued along its socialist path. 
The U.S. policymakers apparently decided that U.S. 
intentions needed to be signaled more strongly to Grenada. 
Naval exercises were chosen as a way of communicating to 
Grenada that the United States was serious in its opposition 
to Grenadian policies, and that the United States expected a 
different kind of state behavior from Grenada. 
In August 1981 the United States conducted a large NATO 
execise in the Caribbean. Analysts have suggested the 
purpose of the exercise was to "frighten Grenada.• 6 This 
naval exercise was therefore conducted in a "noisy" manner, 
attracting much publicity--presumably to alter further the 
state behavior of Nicaragua. 7 In fact, these exercises 
could have seemed very frightening to Grenada for they had 
very suggestive parallels to that country. One of the NATO 
military exercises included a simulated attack upon the 
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island of Vieques (located off the coast of Puerto Rico). 
"The objective was to take power in a fictitious country 
called 'Amber and the Amberines' (unavoidably suggestive of 
Grenada and the Grenadines, especially since there was a 
district called Amber in Grenada) until an election could be 
called and a pro-u.s. government installed.• 8 
In order to evaluate the utility of U.S. military 
strategies, it is necessary to consider whether this military 
signal was clear to the officials of the Grenadian govern-
ment. It could be presumed the signals were understandable 
to the officials in Grenada, as well as to other observors. 
Some evidence for this viewpoint exists in the fact that 
debate in the later U.N. General Assembly, debate regarding 
the eventual U.S. invasion of Grenada, referred to the fact 
that "the intervention had been planned by the U.S. for a 
number of years." 9 It could also be argued that these 
exercises should have been understandable to the Grenadians 
due to suggestive parallels between Grenada and the mock 
invasion plans. 
However, no matter how carefully devised, communicating 
intentions by military strategies presents certain problems. 
For example, even if a nation communicates its intentions 
correctly, there is no guarantee that a nation's communica-
tion will be received correctly. And, regarding the nature 
of a communicated threat, the threatened action may not have 
been credible~ or Grenada may have just chosen to ignore the 
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threat. Furthermore, the assumption that a threat will alter 
behavior becomes questionable when the decision-makers 
consider whether they would back down under similar action by 
an opponent. 10 
At any rate, this signaled threat did not have the 
desired effect upon Grenada, as Grenada continued to develop 
closer ties to the Cubans. And, another U.S. Atlantic fleet 
maneuver which was conducted in May 1982 also failed to alter 
Grenadian policies. 
Yet, the United States continued to pressure Grenada. 
In March of 1983, Reagan claimed "the island was housing 
Cuban and Soviet naval bases and other sophisticated military 
installations,• with photographs and comments released which 
allegedly illustrated military buildup and the military 
aspects of Grenada's new airport. 11 During this televised 
speech Reagan emphasized the strategic nature of the 
Caribbean Basin: 
The Caribbean is a very important passageway for 
our international commerce and military lines of 
communication. More than half of all American 
oil imports now pass through the Caribbean. The 
rapid build-up of Grenada's military potential 
is unrelated to any conceivable threat to this 
island country of under 110,000 people, and 
totally at odds with the pattern of other eastern 
Caribbean States, most of which are unarmed. 
The Soviet-Cuban militarization of Grenada, in 
short, can only been seen as power projection into 
the region, and it is in this important economic and 
strategic area that we are trying to help the 
governments of El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras and 
others in their struggles for democracy against 12 guerrillas supported through Cuba and Nicaragua. 
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On the same day of Reagan's speech, the United States 
attempted to physically demonstrate the verbalized concerns. 
Another naval exercise began in the Caribbean. It was a 
month long exercise, involving 77 U.S. and allied 
warships. 13 
However, the Grenadian government still refused to be 
intimidated. In fact, Bishop's government in Grenada 
attacked Reagan's statement, as an "open declaration of war" 
and placed its military on alert. 14 
Reagan continued to make more statements regarding the 
danger of communism in Grenada. "These statements apparently 
were intended as warnings to Grenada." 15 For example, on 
April 27th, Reagan addressed a joint session of Congress, and 
again stressed the importance of Grenada. Specifically, he 
refered to a recent incident involving Libyan cargo planes. 
They had been heading for Nicaragua--with a disguised ship-
ment of weapons aboard--and were detained by authorities in 
Brazil during a refueling stop. Reagan emphasized the 
strategic location of Grenada by stating: "If that airfield 
on Grenada had been completed, those planes could have 
refueled there and completed their journey."16 
There is some indication that these threats and naval 
maneuvers may have altered the behavior of Grenada at this 
point. In June 1983 Maurice Bishop decided to visit the 
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United States. "In hindsight, Bishop's visit may have been a 
desperate attempt to head off growing extremist opposition, 
and he may genuinely have wished to reduce his Cuban ties or 
at least balance them with some links to the United 
States. 1117 
However, as previously noted, by October 13, Bishop was 
arrested by more extremist colleagues. Although he was later 
freed on October 19, he was executed later on the same day. 
At this point the United States responded with the 
strong military action of actually invading Grenada. Six 
thousand U.S. troops were sent to the island, accompanied by 
300 other soldiers from seven Caribbean states. 
The U.S. government employed several justifications for 
this action. On October 19 several members of the Eastern 
Caribbean States had met, and six nations requested outside 
help from the United States. Reagan also justified the 
invasion as necessary to protect American citizens 
(especially 800 medical students), as necessary to restore 
order and democratic rule, and as necessary to eliminate 
Cuban influence. 18 
After the U.S. invasion it is noteworthy that a 1984 
election was held in Grenada. Hebert A. Blaize, a member of 
the centrist coalition became the new prime minister. 
EVALUATION OF U.S. STRATEGIES 
It is possible to evaluate this military action from a 
variety of perspectives. In the short term, it can be argued 
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that the United States prevented the potential loss of 
American lives in Grenada or that Cuban-Soviet influence was 
thwarted. There is evidence to indicate that U.S. actions in 
Grenada did affect the Cubans. Events in Grenada suggested 
the Cubans could offer no real military assistance to a 
socialist government if the United States was willing to use 
direct military force: 
Prior to Grenada there was much speculation as to 
whether Cuba would follow the precedents of Angola 
and Ethiopia by sending troops to aid Nicaragua in 
the event of a conflict between Nicaragua and its 
neighbors. After Grenada, there was no such 
speculation. The Cubans themselves acknowledged 
their inability to act militarily in Central 
America in the face of the £~erwhelming military 
might of the United States. 
In the long run, however, there are aspects of this 
policy that cause concern. As in earlier cases of 
intervention, forceful U.S. actions have contributed to a 
negative perception regarding United States intentions and 
actions. For example, some speakers debating this issue at 
the General Assembly of the United Nations referred to the 
United States as "imperalist" and interested in continuing 
"colonist domination." 20 The invasion of Grenada was 
criticized also as being unlawful. The United States argued 
that it had a right to intervene based on a treaty clause of 
the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States COECS), but 
other countries pointed out that the OECS document called for 
a majority of countries to request outside help, not merely 
the request from six. And, voting in the U.N. General 
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Assembly, by a vote of 108 to 9, the majority of nations 
approved a statement which "deeply deplored the armed 
intervention in Grenada as constituting a 'flagrant violation 
of international law and of the independence, sovereignty and 
teritory of that State.•• 21 The majority of the membership 
of the OAS also censured the United States for its actions in 
Grenada, with the Venezuelan government being particularly 
outspoken in its criticism. 22 In fact, a number of trad-
itional allies to the United States opposed the invasion, 
including France, Canada, Mexico, and Britain. 23 The 
British emphasized the fact that the invasion of Grenada 
would lessen the West's claim to moral superiority in inter-
national relations when comparisons would be made comparing 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to the U.S. invasion of 
Grenada. 24 Finally, although ultimately vetoed by the 
United States, a Security Council resolution deploring U.S. 
aggression initially received eleven votes to one with two 
abstentions--this voting can be viewed as "giving some 
measure of the scale of international opposition to the U.S. 
action.• 25 
Another problem with the reliance upon military 
strategies is that such policies may limit other foreign 
policy options. It could be argued that the reliance upon 
military strategies has short-circuited other policies such 
as negotiation or more flexible, alternative responses--such 
as a solution which might involve power-sharing between 
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capitalistic and socialistic forces within a country. 
Considering the problems connected with military strategies, 
the decision that force was necessary needs to be 
reevaluated. One method of evaluation is to consider what 
would have happened if no force had been used. Such an 
analysis is admittedly suggestive and speculative. However, 
an examination of several other states in the Caribbean 
suggests that socialist experiments need not lead to full 
membership in the Soviet bloc. 
As noted earlier, several states in the 1970s developed 
socialistic policies which alarmed the United States. The 
United States did not use military strategies to deal with 
these areas, yet these states have not become threats to the 
region or to the United States. For example, it was stated 
that in 1973 Guyana appeared to have a very radical 
government. However, President Forbes Burnham, who had 
dominated Guyanese political life since independence in 1966, 
died in 1985 and was succeeded by Desmond Hoyte who has taken 
some steps to improve the country's relations with the United 
States. In Jamaica, it had seemed alarming when Michael 
Manley had come to off ice in 1972 and when Jamaica preceded 
to embark upon socialistic reforms. However, in 1980 Manley 
lost his reelection bid, and Manley's socialist experiment 
seems to have been stopped. 26 In 1979 Dominica and st. 
Lucia also acquired new governments which stressed reform and 
socialistic measures. However, an unusually severe hurricane 
in October of 1979 caused such physical devastation in 
Dominica that more conservative parties were returned to 
power to try to cope with the damage. In St. Lucia, the 
reformist government never really became effective due to 
"almost incessant feuding.• 27 These examples would suggest 
that an analysis of "splashing socialist dominoes" in the 
Caribbean has not been accurate. 
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Further, the use of U.S. force in Grenada can not only 
be regarded as a specific response to a particular situation, 
but can also be regarded as a larger U.S. policy position in 
the caribbean--a warning of what could happen to other "bad 
neighbors." 28 It would seem that a group of nations 
friendly to the United States (good neighbors) could invite 
the United States to invade a neighbor they see as threat-
ening Ca bad neighbor). Such a request could seem quite 
appealing since the requesting nation would need to con-
tribute only token military forces to the invading force. 
Instead, direct U.S. force, "either through airpower,sea-
power, tactical support, or troops," could be sent into the 
territory of the "bad neighbor." Further, the various 
regional alliances could provide a ready-made framework for 
such a request from the Caribbean states. 
The Reagan Administration's posture toward Grenada has 
had clear implications for other nations in the region. In 
particular, the policy has clear implications for the 
situation in Nicaragua. The U.S. occupation of Grenada has 
------, 
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demonstrated the willingness of the United States to resort 
to pure physical force when other influence methods have not 
achieved the desired goals of the policymakers. Even though 
Grenada is a small island one analyst argued the U.S. 
occupation of Grenada "added bite to the Administration's 
threatening posture toward Nicaragua." 29 
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CHAPTER IV 
NICARAGUA 
During the Reagan Adminstration, Nicaragua, as well as 
Grenada, have come to represent the Communist threat to the 
rest of the Caribbean Basin and to America. This fear has 
been reinforced by the Kissinger Commission's report. 1 
This bipartisan commission, appointed by the Reagan 
Administration, asserted that the revolutionary movement 
opposing the Somoza regime had been seized by self-proclaimed 
Marxist-Leninists. The Commission further noted that the 
Sandinista leadership continued to pattern the Nicaraguan 
government after the Cuban regime. For example, the new 
government was characterized by mass organizations under its 
political direction, while an internal security system 
existed--apparently to supervise the entire population. The 
Commission also pointed to the massive military establishment 
which seemed too large for just the needs of Nicaragua. 
This view of Nicaragua as a threat, as a possible 
exporting vehicle for Soviet-Cuban communism, has intensified 
U.S. involvement in the Caribbean Basin. Further, the United 
States has continued to rely primarily on military policies 
in attempting to alter the state behavior of Nicaragua. An 
in-depth examination of these, as well as past U.S. policies, 
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is necessary for an effective analysis concerning the utility 
of U.S. military strategies in the Caribbean Basin. 
POLITICAL BACKGROUND 
AND EARLY U.S. RESPONSES 
Early Foreign Intervention 
Nicaragua has a long history of intervention. The 
country was under Spanish influence since 1523, although the 
Carib Indians along the Miskito Coast (along the Atlantic) 
remained under British control until the 1800s. 
The history of U.S. intervention can be traced back to 
the 1830s. At this time U.S. businessmen started formulating 
plans to construct an interoceanic canal across Nicaragua. 
This early canal proposal ultimately failed, but the United 
States continued to show interest in this country. 
U.S. policies in regard to Nicaragua became more 
militant. In 1854 the U.S. Foreign Ministry in San Juan del 
Norte had been attacked by Nicaraguans after an anti-United 
States protest. The United States responded by having the 
U.S. warship Cayne fire upon that Nicaraguan port. The 
United States also militarily intervened in Nicaragua other 
times in the 1850s: 1850, 1853, 1854 and 1857. 2 
In 1855 an American adventurer, William Walker, 
declared himself president of Nicaragua. The investor 
Cornelius Vanderbilt eventually forced Walker to surrender to 
the U.S. Navy. Although Walker was a private citizen, he was 
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viewed by many as •a symbol of U.S. expansionism.• 3 This 
impression was reinforced by Walker's subsequent actions. 
Seeking to once again gain influence, Walker conducted two 
more military excursions in the Central American region, 
although he was finally captured and killed by the Hondurans. 
The United States did not interfere in Nicaragua again 
until 1910 when the Taft Admnistration actively aided a 
Conservative Party revolt against President Zelaya whose 
nationalism threatened the perceived interests of the United 
States. The U.S. Marines remained intermittently in 
Nicaragua throughout the following twenty years. 4 
"Although the numbers of marines were small, they were able 
to effectively control national policy.• 5 An example of 
this control was the link between the military and economic 
policies. Bolstered by the presence of the Marines, U.S. 
financial advisers administered the nation's financial 
policies--even to the extent of creating the c6rdoba as 
the national currency. During this early period, United 
States power was at first maintained by its own military 
presence. However, over time a privileged elite developed 
who profited from the occupation, thereby lending its support 
to U.S. preferences. 6 
The U.S. forces left Nicaragua in 1925 but returned the 
next year to enforce a political settlement; this event led 
the United states into confrontation with Augusto Cesar 
Sandino. Sandino opposed the American presence and organized 
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a peasant army to oppose U.S. forces. •The war proved 
indecisive on the ground and unpopular in the United States, 
forcing American withdrawal in 1933.• 7 The principal 
legacy of the U.S. occupation was the National Guard which 
was a military force trained by U.S. Marines and placed under 
the pro-u.s. officer Anastasio Somoza Garcia, with the hope 
that the guard would "keep peace and protect U.S. interests" 
in the area. 8 
Sandino remained an important political force in 
Nicaragua, until he was murdered in 1934 at the order of the 
commander of the American trained National Guard, Somoza. 9 
In 1936 Somoza pressured his main competition Sacasa into 
resignation, assuming direct control of Nicaraguan affairs. 
However, the United States still desired to influence 
events in Nicaragua. Therefore, the United States maintained 
close relations with the Somoza regime. The degree to which 
the United States felt secure about its influence over the 
American-educated and supported leader is indicated by 
Franklin Roosevelt's famous phrase (referring to Somoza) that 
he was: "Our son of a bitch."lO 
Somoza continued to consolidate economic and political 
power, establishing a military dictatorship. Somoza was shot 
in 1956 and died from his wounds. However, his sons--first 
Luis Somoza Debayle, and then the younger son Anastasio 
Samoza Debayle--continued the Somoza dictatorship. 
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The Seeds of Revolution11 
The Somoza regime was increasingly beset by problems. 
Although the insurrection leading to the downfall of 
Anastasio Somoza Debayle was initiated by events in the 
1970s, it was more fundamentally caused by inequities that 
had developed during previous decades. These problems 
included export dependence on a sometimes fluctuating world 
market, peasants who had been forced off land that was 
desired for export production, and severe problems of 
unemployment. The severity of the Nicaraguan situation can 
be indicated by the fact that during the last twenty years of 
Somozan rule the GNP increased, but the rate of childhood 
malnutrition grew. Clearly benefits were not evenly 
distributed; military force was utilized to support the 
status quo. 
The situation which precipitated a crisis for the 
Somozan rule was a massive earthquake which destroyed much of 
Managua in 1972. Thousands of Nicaraguans suffered facing 
even more hardships as the Somozan government siphoned off 
millions of dollars that had been intended for international 
relief. Resentment over this situation fueled desires for 
reform. 
The Somozan regime increasingly became opposed. More 
moderate groups included broad alliances of business, labor 
and political organizations which opposed the Somoza dicta-
torship. These groups fought Somoza with declarations, 
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petitions, and negotiations--as well as with demonstrations 
and strikes. The radical opposition was led by the 
Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN). This group sought 
major social and economic change: 
The Sandinistas shared the Marxism that was common 
in the anti-regime student-political milieu from which 
most FSLN leaders came, and they were inspired by the 
young Cuban revolution. Some were connected 
with the Moscow-oriented Nicaraguan Socialist Party 
(Partido Socialista Nicaraguense-PSN). However, 
Sandinista ideology was and remains ill-defined, 
heterodox and pragmatic. From the beginning, 
party programs spoke of preserving a place for 
private enterprise within a planned economy. 
Catholic radicals gained positions of prominence 
among the leadership, a situation u~~maginable in 
an orthodox Marxist-Leninist party. 
Nevertheless, after years of U.S. influence in the 
Somoza regime the United States viewed the new situation with 
alarm. In particular, the Carter Administraiton stuggled to 
find appropriate policies to deal with this situation. 
Carter's Response 
Under the Carter Administration the United States had 
struggled to maintain influence in Nicaragua. Yet Carter had 
professed interest in promoting human rights and exploring 
peaceful strategies. In fact, this policy seemed to have 
been pursued in 1977 when military aid to the Somozan regime 
was halted in response to the alleged brutality and 
repression of the National Guard. 
However, the carter Administration still relied on 
military pressure to gain U.S. desired goals. For example, 
it has been reported that during the rule of Somoza, Carter 
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had signed a presidential "finding" that •covert action by 
the CIA was needed in Nicaragua" for the •national security" 
of the United States. 13 And, by mid-1978 the United States 
provided $12 million in economic aid to Somoza, claiming that 
the regime no longer had severe human right violations. 14 
"By appearing to re-endorse Somoza, Carter inadvertently 
undermined the moderate opposition and increased support for 
the FSLN."lS 
After the popular uprising of September 1978 the Carter 
Administration appeared to accept that the Somozan regime 
could not be maintained. At that point, the United States 
initiated a series of actions designed to replace Somoza and 
to develop a working relationship with moderate reform 
elements inside Nicaragua. When the carter Administration 
failed at these attempts, the U.S. suggested an O.A.S. 
peacekeeping force for Nicaragua. This also failed, being 
viewed in fact as •a facade for armed intervention to 
forestall a Sandinista victory" and to maintain the key 
elements of the Somoza regime "without the dictator." 16 
The Sandinistas continued to solidify their control in 
Nicaragua. And on July 19, 1979, the few remaining members 
of the Somoza regime were evacuated from the country. The 
initial composition of the new government reflected a variety 
of political forces. 
The Carter Administration attempted to develop a 
positive relationship with the new government. United States 
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negotiators met with Nicaraguan officials and aid was 
extended to Nicaragua. For example, during Carter's last 
year in off ice several million dollars of loans were made to 
Nicaragua and Nicaragua renegotiated a debt of almost $490 
million. 17 
However, tensions existed between Nicaragua and the 
United States. The American policymakers were concerned with 
the growing exclusion of moderates, with the increasingly 
strident Marxist-Leninist statements, by the eventual emer-
gence of Daniel Ortega as the Nicaraguan leader, and by the 
growing fear that the Sandinistas intended to support similar 
revolutions throughout the Caribbean area. 
These tensions would be exacerbated during the Reagan 
Administration. In fact, Ronald Reagan's election to the 
presidency in November 1980 marked a shift in U.S.-Nicaraguan 
relations. 18 
REAGAN AND THE ATTEMPTED COMMUNIST ROLLBACK 
Early Reagan Policies 
Ronald Reagan "had run on a party platform that, in 
thinly veiled language, urged support for efforts to depose 
the Sandinistas;• yet, the new Reagan administration did not 
immediately reorient U.S. policies. 19 For example, 
Ambassador Pezzullo who had been closely associated with 
Carter's philosophy, kept his office until 1981. 20 
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Early Use of Threats. However, by 1981 the U.S. 
interactions with Nicaragua were becoming more menacing. 
Concerned about reports that the Nicaraguans were supplying 
arms to El Salvadoran rebels, the United States demanded that 
such aid be halted. In spite of reports that Nicaragua was 
indeed halting or substantially reducing such shipments, the 
U.S. Government stated in April 1981 that no more financial 
aid--or wheat sales--would be continued. 21 
In July 1981 the Sandinistas announced more socialistic 
measures, including a decree expropriating thirteen major 
private firms; the United States responded to this situation 
by initiating a series of diplomatic talks, with Assistant 
Secretary of State Thomas Enders representing the United 
States. In retrospect, U.S. interactions with Nicaragua at 
this time can be viewed as involving military threats to the 
Sandinista government, even though such threats were 
"d' · d d' 1 t' · · · · " 22 1 isgu1se as ip oma ic in1t1at1ves. For examp e, 
under Enders sponsorship, the United States implied that if 
the Sandinistas were more "cooperative,• the United States 
would sign a nonaggression pact with Nicaragua and that the 
United States would disband "the camps in Florida where 
Nicaraguan exiles were training to overthrow the Sandinista 
government." 23 The obvious threat was that the United 
States would continue such activities if the Sandinistas 
proved uncooperative. Seemingly Enders was willing to use 
military policies to influence the situation. However, 
"Enders sought to use the immense U.S. power as a stick to 
shape negotiations rather than as a club to drive the 
Sandinistas and FMLN into oblivion." 24 These threats were 
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not "well-received," with Nicaragua seemingly determined not 
to alter its state behavior as a result of U.S. threats. 25 
In November of 1981, Alexander Haig, then Secretary of 
State, testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. 
Haig continued to present a threatening posture by refusing 
to dismiss the possibility of a military blockade of 
Nicaragua or assistance to the Nicaraguan exiles trying to 
overthrow the Sandinista government. 
Attempts at Credibility. In November 1981, backing 
previous threats with credible actions, the National Security 
Council CNSC) decided to implement a larger scale program to 
deal with opposition to U.S. policies in the Caribbean Basin. 
The program included: 
••• subversive operations inside Nicaragua, support 
for paramilitary operations against the Sandinistas 
from the outside, economic pressures, military 
threats, contingency planning for military inter-
vention, increased intelligence activity, propaganda 
efforts, more military aid to El Salvador and more 
pressures on Cuba, and jo~gt planning with America's 
friends in Latin America. 
In November the United States also attempted to 
reinforce its credibility by conducting large naval exercises 
in the Caribbean CREADEX-1) "as a warning to Nicaragua." 27 
These exercises involved other NATO countries, presumably 
sending an even more credible threat to Nicaragua. 
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Debate Regarding U.S. Policies. This reliance upon 
military strategies was alarming to many. In the summer of 
1982, during CIA briefings, Congress was informed that 
U.S.-supported contras had destroyed two major bridges inside 
Nicaragua in March, and that the "supposedly limited commando 
forces had grown to 15,000 soldiers" who were preparing to 
relocate some of their camps from Honduras to Northern 
Nicaragua. The legality of these activities was questioned 
and the fear of a war between Honduras and Nicaragua--started 
by the CIA and the contras--grew. In response to these 
concerns (August, 1982) Congress amended the secret 
intelligence bill, setting clear limits on U.S. covert 
operations in the Caribbean Basin. 28 
Yet, American policy was still not clearly defined 
regarding the reliance upon military strategies. 29 In 
December 1982 Congress had •publically approved• the Boland 
Amendment which specifically prevented the Reagan 
Administration from financing the contras for the purpose of 
overthrowing Nicaragua's government. However, various policy 
makers insisted that enough force was needed to achieve 
•symmetry". To these officials symmetry meant that the 
contras, with U.S. backup would respond to any Nicaraguan 
military action with a similar strategy of their own. The 
concept of symmetry permitted the Administration to argue, 
however, that it was only acting toward Nicaragua as 
Nicaragua acted toward others, even though the contras Reagan 
funded in Nicaragua declared openly their goal was to 
overthrow the Sandinistas. 30 
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Certain U.S. policy makers, then, favored using 
military strategies; however, just as they had to contend 
with a reluctant Congress, so they had to contend with a 
regional group which sponsored negotiation rather than 
confrontation. In January 1982, a group of countries--
Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Panama--met on the Panamanian 
island of Contadora. These countries became known as the 
Contadora group, and seemed to promise an alternative to U.S. 
military solutions. This complicated the use of military 
policies by the United States. The Administration needed to 
appear as if it were responsive to negotiations if it hoped 
to stay on good terms with Congress. The tension between 
choosing between military strategies or negotiations is 
evidenced by the fact that Reagan was careful to appeal to 
both factions. When President Reagan addressed a joint 
session of Congress on April 27th, he announced that "we will 
support dialogue and negotiations--both among the countries 
of the region and within each country." 31 Yet, Reagan also 
called for increased economic and military aid "to bolster 
humane democratic systems" and respond to "the military 
challenge from Cuba and Nicaragua." 32 
By the spring of 1983 there was more debate as to the 
degree of military influence that ought to be exerted. It 
was becoming clear that halting guerilla activity in 
El Salvador would not be an easy task. Further, Nicaragua 
continued to establish closer ties with the Cubans and 
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Soviets. Administration officials became even more concerned 
that Nicaragua could serve as an attractive model for other 
Marxist/socialist revolutions, as well as offering military 
support to such groups. "By May there was plainly an intense 
debate within the Administration over whether it should go 
beyond its existing program of 'covert' aid to anti-
Sandinista guerillas, to threaten Nicaragua more directly 
with the application of direct U.S. power.• 33 
Continued Threats and Military Strategies. The 
increasing U.S. reliance upon military strategies is clearly 
evidenced by U.S. activities which began in early July 1983. 
At this time large-scale joint military maneuvers between the 
United States and Honduras were announced. 
Although the Reagan Administration initially presented 
these joint military maneuvers, called the Big Pine II 
maneuvers, as routine--these military exercises seemed 
clearly designed to influence the Sandinistas to alter the 
state behavior of Nicaragua. Part of the exercise included 
naval activities. These exercises included a naval 
show-of-force by the United States. However, U.S. Forces 
were so great that it could be argued these forces were meant 
to do more than just display power, they were meant as a 
threat. For example, two separate naval forces, including 
U.S. warships and aircraft carriers, were sent by the United 
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States and were assigned to each side of the Nicaraguan 
coast. The threatening nature of this U.S. action is clear 
when one considers that: 
The destructive force represented by the guns 
and planes carried on these two armadas is 
phenomenal: It should be noted that at no 
time did the United States deploy as much 
naval-based fire power in Southeast Asia 
thro~~hout the entire course of the Vietnam 
war. 
Furthermore, the nature of the exercises was threatening. 
During these exercises the Navy practiced blockade 
techniques. 35 And, Marines stated a practice amphibious 
landing on the nearby coast of Honduras. 36 Aside from the 
naval activities, American personnel were also stationed in 
several neighboring countries near Nicaragua. The 
threatening nature of the American troops can be evidenced by 
their close geographical proximity to Nicaragua. For 
example, one group was sent to a nnarrow strip of land near 
the Gulf of Fonesca that separates El Salvador and 
Nicaragua.n 37 Another naval crew was ordered to dig wells 
in Guanacaste--a northern Costa Rican province which is just 
na few minutes driven from the Nicaraguan border. 38 
These exercises, then, involved a display of U.S. force 
which was an attempt to communicate a threat, thereby 
influencing Sandinista behavior. The threat was communicated 
by the U.S. actions themselves. Aside from the nature and 
location of these military maneuvers, the scope of these 
exercises were larger than earlier maneuvers--presumably, 
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this could communicate a stronger message to the Sandinistas. 
And, these exercises were designed to last months, rather 
than just the days or weeks of previous U.S. maneuvers. 39 
In fact, so many thousands of Americans were involved that 
the Big Pine II exercises could be considered as "nothing 
less than a temporary stationing of U.S. armed forces in the 
Isthmus." 40 
The United States did not rely entirely on its actions 
to communicate its displeasure to Nicaragua. More threaten-
ing statements were made. Top Reagan Administration 
officials publicly stated that unless Cuba halted shipments 
to Nicaragua, President Reagan "had not ruled out estab-
lishing a military quarantine around Nicaragua." 41 Other 
"unnamed Administration officials" repeated strong statements 
to the popular press, such as the statement found in a Time 
magazine: "We want to persuade the bad guys in Nicaragua and 
Cuba that we are positioned to block, invade, or interdict if 
they cross a particular threshold." 42 Furthermore, during 
this period of time, U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick talked 
"openly about the possibility of interdiction,• and when 
asked if the naval maneuvers were showing the Sandinistas 
that the U.S. could blockade Nicaragua, Kirkpatrick replied, 
"Maybe. Maybe we'll remind them of that." 43 
There is some evidence that U.S. Forces served more of 
a purpose than "gunboat diplomacy• and coercion, that they 
actually served a military function, thus representing an 
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escalation of force. The contras were supported by the 
United States and therefore benefited from the U.S. troop 
presence. In fact, U.S. troops •acted as a shield to protect 
contra forays across the Nicaraguan border;• and it can be 
argued that "it was no accident that upsurges in contra acton 
did occur• during these exercises. 44 
By the end of 1983 it was clear that the United States 
had continually increased its reliance upon military 
strategies. Big Pine II represented the largest maneuvers 
conducted by the United States, larger even than naval 
displays in Vietnam during that war. Known United States 
armed forces in the area had increased from 500 in December 
1981 to about 15,000 in late 1983. 45 Originally, President 
Reagan approved a $19.5 million program of funding covert 
activities in Central America, for the stated purpose of 
"stopping Nicaraguan arms shipments to Salvadoran and other 
Central American rebels.• 46 Budgetary arrangements for 
funding subsequent operations have not been entirely clear. 
However, a press report has referred to the United States 
Congress as having approved about $20 million for 1983, and 
in November 1983, legislation was adopted that no more than 
$24,000,000 was to be allocated for military or paramilitary 
t . . . 47 ac ions in Nicaragua. 
Evaluation of Early Policies 
The United States has clearly relied upon military 
strategies in dealing with Nicaragua. President Carter made 
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some attempts to shift the focus of U.S. policies; but the 
Carter Administration did not maintain a consistent approach 
to Nicaragua, relying intermittently upon military strategies 
when they seemed needed. When Nicaragua did not appear to 
be responding to veiled military threats (such as the ones 
referred to in 1981 regarding the camps in Florida), the 
United States used more direct threats, and attempted to 
support these verbal statements by concrete actions to make 
these threats even more credible. During the Reagan 
Administration United States policymakers resorted even more 
to military strategies. Such heavy reliance upon military 
policies has lead one analyst to write that the United States 
has used military options as a substitute for state policy, 
with diplomacy and politics being replaced by threats and 
military escalation. 48 
camouflaged Tactics and Information. Since much 
information regarding Nicaragua is classified, it is not an 
easy task to evaluate U.S. military policies in Nicaragua. 
Clearly it would often be a disadvantage to openly discuss 
the underlying reasons of U.S. negotiation strategy--or to 
state that a military maneuver was designed only as a bluff. 
Furthermore, military policies have been of a covert nature. 
Therefore, there are innumerable difficulties in 
documenting such U.S. military involvement. It is known that 
the United States has provided military weapons to "friendly" 
countries, countries which are willing to oppose Nicaragua. 
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For example, in March 1982 the United States provided 10 Bell 
UH-lH helicopters to Honduras. These planes were provided at 
no cost to Honduras under a special lease program. 49 
American personnel were needed to provide training regarding 
these helicopters. However, the numbers of U.S. military 
personnel have been hard to track. By 1982 a Pentagon 
spokesman stated that a number of U.S. military personnel had 
trained the Hondurans in technical areas as "helicopter 
maintenance and air base security," but he added the number 
of U.S. personnel have changed "too frequently for us to keep 
tabs," and a specific breakdown of the U.S. trainers and 
their function was "unavailable." 50 Not only have there 
not always been clear indications regarding the exact number 
of Americans involved in suport of other country's military 
policies, but there have not always been clear indications as 
to the exact scope of these American personnel. For example, 
the Green Beret Special Forces were reportedly in Panama as 
advisors. However, in 1981 they were reported as having 
actually been seen patroling the border between Panama and 
El Salvador, dressed in camouflage and carrying M16s. 51 
Another incident explains how the Administration has 
attempted to avoid Congressional oversight and restrictions, 
but also indicates the difficulty of accurately reporting 
U.S. military involvement in the region.52 Normally, to 
provide funds to build bases or provide military supplies to 
a foreign government, the American government first must 
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obtain the consent of Congress, "a consent which has been 
increasingly difficult to achieve.• Yet the United States 
military constructed a base at Durzuna claiming it was needed 
to conduct U.S. military exercises there. When the exercises 
were over, the military equipment that had been funded for 
U.S. military maneuvers was simply left behind--for contra 
use. Since this money and equipment does not appear in any 
category of U.S. security assistance to Honduras, it serves 
to hide the true amount and proportion of military aid that 
the public knows about. 
Unwilling to appear as an aggressor and restrained by a 
Congress which became increasingly hesitant to rely upon 
military straegies, the United States policymakers encouraged 
other countries sympathetic of the U.S. stance to aid the 
contras. In mid-1983 Israel was "persuaded" to supplement 
U.S. military aid by sending weapons captured in Lebanon to 
officials in the Honduran government--weapons that would be 
distributed eventually to the contras. 53 
Restricted Options. Since information regarding 
U.S. military strategies has often been restricted and since 
publicized satements have often been made for effect (as with 
threats) a certain amount of speculation is involved in 
analyzing U.S. policies. 
However, it is clear that over a period of time, 
U.S. policymakers who favored stronger U.S. actions gained 
prominence within the Reagan Administration. For example, in 
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the early 1980s policy toward Nicaragua had largely been in 
the hands of the State Department--specifically, under the 
direction of Thomas Enders. Enders came to develop strong 
views regarding the Nicarguan situation; he has been reported 
as finally viewing the situation there •as not warranting 
direct U.S. military intervention.• 54 Rather, Enders 
favored isolation and containment of the Nicaraguan 
government, with emphasis on seeking a negotiated settle-
ment. 55 However, Enders' approach was disputed by others, 
especially by then National Security Advisor William P. Clark 
and Jeane Kirkpatrick, then U.S. Ambassador to the United 
Nations. 56 Enders was eventually replaced by Langhorn 
Motley whose early views reflected reliance upon military 
t t . 57 s ra eg1es. However, over a period of time, Motley 
preferred policies which sought alternatives to military 
force or threats. In fact, Motley decided that "United 
States military escalation created the opposite results that 
it had set out to achieve.• 58 
Still, the Reagan Administration did not appear to 
fully explore policies other than military ones. 
Specifically, it has been suggested that the Reagan 
Administration "used diplomatic discussions as a fig leaf for 
military escalation.• 59 For example, it has been suggested 
that Nicaragua did experience political and economic 
pressures due to the activities of the u.s.-supported 
contras; and that by July 1982 the Sandinista regime did 
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alter its behavior by relaxing media censorship and by 
presenting new draft proposals to the Contadora countries; 
these actions can be viewed as "conciliatory" gestures which 
clearly signaled that it wanted "to reach accomodation with 
the United States." 60 However, the Reagan Administration 
has been criticized because it did not "test or explore the 
Nicaraguan gambit," but instead continued to ask for more 
. f . 61 f l' . concessions rom Nicaragua. In act, U.S. po lc1es 
seemed to consist of tactics of "sanctions and pressure."62 
Just as the United States restricted its own domestic 
policy options, it also did not fully explore Contadora 
regional peacemaking efforts. United States reluctance 
regarding the Contadora proposals may have stemmed from U.S. 
hesitation to participate in a rather unpredictable nego-
tiation process. 63 A National Security document from the 
time of these negotiations has been made public; it revealed 
the United States had a deep mistrust of the Mexicans and 
their approach to the region, which tacitly implied some 
political particpation for the socialists in El Salvador and 
th S d .. t . . 64 e an ln1s as in Nicaragua. 
Risk v. Effective Policy. There is some evidence 
which suggests that U.S. military strategies did have an 
impact on Nicaragua. For example, by September 1983 
Nicaragua "seemed more responsive to the negotiating efforts 
presented by the Contadora groups." 65 The Sandinistas also 
attempted to placate other states by removing several Cuban 
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advisors, lightening their censorship of the press, and 
making statements regarding the importance of a fair 
electoral process. 66 To some it seemed that "gunboat 
diplomacy" so concerned the Sandinistas that they decided to 
radically change tactics." 67 • Specifically, the Big Pine 
II exercises were considered by government officials to be an 
effective communication of U.S. intentions, responsible for 
the altered state behavior of Nicaragua. 68 
The state behavior of the Soviet Union and Cuba also 
altered. Castro now offered to "work out a deal with 
President Reagan to pull out all foreign military advisors 
from Central America." 69 And, during a naval incident, 
occuring within a week of the Big Pine II exercises,the 
Soviets were "unusually restrained;" they "clearly shied away 
from a confrontation with the u.s." 70 It was considered 
that this Soviet caution may have been due to "the Reagan 
Adminisration's evident disposition to use force to shore up 
the American sphere of influence." 71 
State behavior of Nicaragua, Cuba and the Soviet Union 
did alter; however, the evidence is suggestive rather than 
conclusive regarding the cause for the changed behavior. The 
tentative nature of these findings is partially due to a 
restricted amount of available information concerning the 
subject. The altered actions could have been influenced by 
factors, other than coercion. For example, altered actions 
could have been designed for Nicaraguan propaganda value, 
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with the United States portrayed as an aggressive and 
militaristic nation, as contrasted to Nicaragua, a nation 
trying to present itself as reasonable, as interested in 
negotiations. Or, Nicaragua and Cuba may have been sincerely 
seeking an accomodation with their neighbors. For example, 
now that the Sandinistas had gained political control they 
may have desired to strengthen and solidify their programs 
within Nicaragua rather than becoming IOOre involved with 
regional reform movements. The Soviet Union may not have 
been affected by coercion either. The Soviet Union may 
simply have been preoccupied with internal matters, such as 
the illness or succession of new leaders. Or, the Soviet 
Union may simply have restricted its policy voluntarily. 
Involvement in both Afghanistan and the Caribbean (with the 
Caribbean representing even more of a financial commitment 
due to its distant geographical location) could have been 
considered unwise from an economic viewpoint. 
Regardless of the true reason for altered state 
behavior, the Reagan Administration interpreted Nicaraguan, 
Cuban and Soviet rections as an indication that U.S. military 
strategies had been successful. 72 Rather than pursuing 
unpredictable negotiations which possibly could accord 
socialists some legitimacy, the United States viewed military 
strategies as a more controllable approach to the region's 
problems. 73 When Nicaraguan actions appeared "as a sign 
they were buckling under" these strategies seemed successful; 
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to many U.S. policymakers it became imperative for the United 
States "to increse the pressure" on the Sandinistas even 
more. 74 
Even if the use of military force was successful in 
altering the behavior of states as a consequence of the 
Big Pine II exercises, it is still questionable whether the 
United States ought to rely upon such strategies. As pointed 
out previously in the historical section of this paper, 
United States influence and intervention has been resented. 
There already exists •anti-Yankee" sentiment and recent U.S. 
responses only strengthen such attitudes. For example, in 
mid-August of 1983, President Miguel de la Madrid (Mexico) 
cautioned Prsident Reagan against aggravating existing 
problems through U.S. 8 Shows of force." 75 
Aside from such reactions, U.S. military policies 
involve a certain amount of risk. There is always the danger 
of escalation, even the risk of war. For example, within one 
week of the Big Pine II naval maneuvers an incident occured 
which could have led to an escalation of military forces. In 
this incident "a U.S. destroyer harassed a Soviet freighter 
by demanding to be told its cargo and destination, then 
shadowing it for the next forty miles until it turned into 
Nicaraguan territorial waters to enter Corinto, the nation's 
largest port.• 76 While this incident demonstrated the 
resolve of the U~ited States it can also be considered as 
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"brazen and reckless" and could have led to a situation as 
serious as the confrontation between the United States and 
the Soviet Union in the Cuban Missile Crisis. 77 During 
this same period of time, former Vice-President Mondale 
warned that escalation would occur: " ••• under present 
policies it is inevitable that American troops will be sent 
to Central America ••• " 78 
There was also the problem of planned operations 
exceeding their original limits. Reporters in Newsweek 
magazine claimed, in fact, that operations along the 
Nicaraguan-Honduran border "have escalated far beyond 
Washington's original intentions." 79 The involvement of 
the United States in the support of the contras has provided 
a particular problem. There was the question of how much 
control the planners in Washington or the U.S. advisors in 
the field actually had concerning the military force used by 
the contras. For example, in May 1983, one of the contras, 
Pedro Pablo Ortiz Centeno who called himself "Commander 
Suicide," went on a personal rampage. This illustrated but 
one aspect of the difficulty involving the control of the 
contra forces. One analyst wrote that the forces backed by 
Washington must be under tight control, "But the actions of 
Suicide suggested they were under little or no contro1.• 80 
Regardless of the possible negative impact of U.S. 
military strategies in the Caribbean Basin and regardless of 
the actual risk involved in these actions, the United States 
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continued to employ military strategies to try to influence 
and coerce Nicaragua into state behavior that would be more 
acceptable to the United States. 
REAGAN AND THE MINING OF THE NICARAGUAN HARBORS 
By 1984, there was no improvement between the United 
States and Nicaraguan relations. While the Sandinistas had 
made certain negotiating suggestions previously, by 1984 "the 
Sandinistas had taken about as many conciliatory steps as 
they were likely to be willing to do." 81 They also ver-
bally indicated their belief that the Reagan Administration 
would not be satisfied until they gave up so many principles 
"that they stopped being Sandinistas." 82 
Even while continuing its participation in the 
negotiating process, the United States continued to rely upon 
military policies. This time a stronger policy was devised, 
designed to presumably send an even stronger message to 
Nicaragua. By November 1984, the Reagan Administration 
focused less on the shipment of arms by Nicaragua to other 
countries (possibly because there was little proof regarding 
these activities). Increasingly, the Administration 
spokesmen began insisting that "major changes in the basic 
nature of the Sandinista regime itself" occur. 83 And, the 
United States became involved in the laying of mines in or 
close to various Nicaraguan ports. 
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The Course of Events 
Official information regarding these incidents has not 
been clearly documented. However, U.S. involvement in the 
mining incidents seems well substantiated. 84 U.S. press 
reports quote U.S. administration officials as saying that 
mines were constructed by the CIA with the help of a United 
States Navy Laboratory. Another press report indicated that 
it was announced in the U.S. Senate that the CIA Director 
informed a select intelligence committee that President 
Reagan had approved a plan for the mining of Nicaraguan 
ports. President Reagan later revealed knowledge about the 
mines in another press report, although he claimed Nicaraguan 
rebels had laid the mines. Still other press reports from 
top Reagan officials stated that the "mother ships" used for 
the operation were operated by U.S. nationals. 
Nicaragua complained about such military activities to 
the United Nations Security Council. However, through its 
use of the veto, the United States was able to prevent any 
action favorable to Nicaragua. 85 
Then, in April 1984 Nicaragua applied to the 
International Court of Justice (!CJ) for relief. In spite of 
United States arguments opposing the Court's jurisdiction, 
the ICJ found it had jurisdiction to try this case. The 
Court did try the case, without U.S. participation in 
pleadings or oral arguments, and decided on June 27, 1986 in 
favor of Nicaraguan claims. 
----------., 
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The ICJ Judgment 
In Nicaragua v. United States of America the ICJ 
agreed that the United States had been pursuing military 
policies in regard to Nicaragua. The Court noted that it was 
indeed difficult to evaluate the facts and evidence regarding 
the alleged incidents. The United States did not admit to 
the military activities and, as noted, information regarding 
these events was limited. The ICJ relied upon the previously 
mentioned press reports for its judgment against the United 
States. The Court also noted that in a previously filed 
Counter Memorial, the United States had referred to the fact 
it had taken certain measures in self-defense. While the 
united States did not list specific facts regarding these 
self-defense measures, the Court noted that the normal pur-
pose of mentioning self-defense is to justify conduct which 
would otherwise be wrongful: •The Court thus cannot consider 
reliance on self-defense to be an implicit general admission 
on the part of the United States: but it is certainly a 
recognition as to the imputability of some of the activities 
complained of .• 86 
Specific U.S. Military Actions. The Court was very 
specific regarding the United States military involvement in 
its final judgment. For example, Paragraph 80 states: 
••• the Court finds it established that, on a 
date in late 1983 or early 1984, the President 
of the United States authorized a United States 
government agency to lay mines in Nicaraguan 
ports1 that in early 1984 mines were laid in or 
close to the ports of El Bluff, Corinto and 
Puerto Sandino, either in Nicaraguan internal 
waters or in its territorial sea or both, by 
persons in the pay and acting on the instructions 
of that agency, under the supervision and with the 
logistic support of United States agents1 that 
neither before the laying of the mines, nor subse-
quently, did the United States Government issue 
any public and official warning to international 
shipping of the existence and location of the mines1 
and that personal and material injury was caused by 
the ~xplosi?n o~ the ~ine~, which also crg;ted risks 
causing a rise in marine insurance rates. 
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In addition to the laying of mines, the Court also found the 
United States was implicated in other military activities, 
including: 
Cl> 10 October 1983: an attack was made by air and 
sea on the port of Corinto, involving the 
destruction of five oil storage tanks, the 
loss of millions of gallons of fuel, and the 
evacuation of large numbers of the local 
population1 
(2) 14 October 1983: the underwater oil pipeline 
at Puerto Sandino was again blown up: 
(3) 3/4 January 1984: an attack was made by 
speedboats and helcopters using rockets 
against the Potosi Naval Base: 
(4) 7 March 1984: an attack was made on oil and 
storage facility at San Juan del Sur by 
speedboats and helicopters1 
(5) 28/30 March 1984: clashes occurred at Puerto 
Sandino between speedboats, in the course 
of minelaying operations, and Nicaraguan 
patrol boats1 intervention by a helicopter in 
support of the speedboats: 
(6) 9 April 1984: a helicopter allegedly launched 
from a mother ship in international waters 
provided fire suppo9~ for an ARDE attack on 
San Juan del Norte. 
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After examining further Nicaraguan complaints regarding 
U.S. violations of Nicaraguan airspace, and U.S. support of 
the contras, the Court did find the United States had 
conducted high-altitude overflights, and two lower flights 
which resulted in sonic booms, with these incidents occurring 
from November 7-11, 1984. 89 It was also concluded that 
U.S. citizens, both military and nonmilitary provided 
assistance to the contras in these incidents. 90 
Specific U.S. Violations of International Law. The 
Court declared these U.S. military strategies violated inter-
national law in several respects. Not only were specific 
treaties violated, but the Court concluded that the United 
States also had acted contrary to the general customs and 
principles of international law. 
While the Court did not find that the United States 
"controlled the contras to the degree that the United States 
would be legally responsible for all illegal contra acts," 
the Court did find that the U.S. support of the contras was 
"a clear breach of the principle of non-intervention." 91 
The Court observed that no evidence existed that the United 
States was responsible for the creation of the contra force. 
According to the Court: "It seems certain that members of 
the former Somoza National Guard, together with civilian 
opponents to the Sandinista regime, withdrew from Nicaragua 
soon after that regime was installed in Managua, and sought 
to continue their struggle against it ••• " 92 Yet, the Court 
determined that over the years the U.S. support for the 
contras grew: 
However, it is in the Court's view established 
that the support of the United States authorities 
for the activities of the contras took various 
forms over the years, such as logistic support, 
the supply of information on the location and 
movements of the Sandinista troops, the use of 
sophisticated methods of communication, the 
deployment of field brodcasting networks, radar 
coverage, etc. The Court finds it clear that a 
number of military and paramilitary operations 
by this force were decided and planned, if not 
actually by United States advisors, then at 
least in close collaboration with them, and on 
the basis of the intelligence and logistic 
support which the United States was able to offer, 
particularly the supply aircr~~t provided to the 
contras by the United States. 
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Still, the Court stated there was "no clear evidence of the 
United States having actually exercised such a degree of 
control in all fields as to justify treating the contras as 
acting on its behalf ." 94 As a result of this latter con-
clusion, the Court did not find the United States guilty of 
humanitarian crimes committed by the contras. 
However, the Court also found that the United States 
had intervened in Nicaragua contrary to the principles of 
international law. The Court noted that the United States 
policy toward Nicaragua "has consistently sought to achieve 
changes in Nicaraguan policy and behavior." 95 Further, the 
Court found that the United States was well aware of the 
contras' intentions to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. 
The Court therefore found: 
•.. the support given by the United States, up to 
the end of Septemer 1984, to the military and 
paramilitary activities of the contras in 
Nicaragua, by financial support, training, supply 
of weapons, intelligence and logistic support, 
constitutes a cle§6 breach of the principle of 
non-intervention. 
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Such actions were also "in breach of its obligation ••• not to 
use force against another state." 97 
The Court noted that the United States had attempted to 
justify its support of the contra actions by claiming the 
Sandinista government was repressive. The United States 
claimed tha Nicaragua had taken "significant steps towards 
establishing a totalitarian Communist dictatorship;" but the 
Court found that even if this were true, it would not open up 
"a right of intervention by one State against another on the 
ground that the latter has opted for some particular ideology 
or political system." 98 
Furthermore, the Court claimed the U.S. laying of the 
mines also violated customary international law. For 
example, this action was an abridgement of Nicaragua's 
freedom of communication and maritime commerce. 99 And, by 
directing or authorizing overflights of Nicaraguan territory, 
the United States was found to have acted •in breach of its 
obligation under customary international law not to violate 
the sovereignty of another state."100 
While the Court did not find the United States guilty 
of violating international humanitarian law, it did note that 
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the United States had acted contrary to the principles of 
humanitarian law by producing and distributing a 1983 manual 
entitled: "Psychological Operations in Guerilla Warfare.• 
The Court did not find evidence specifically linking the 
United States to humanitarian crimes, and it was noted that 
the CIA later attempted to modify the effect of this 
pamphlet. Yet, the Court felt the document must still have 
served as an "encouragement• to those who would "commit acts 
contrary to general principles of international humanitarian 
law reflected in treaties."lOl 
The Court noted even more U.S. violations. The laying 
of mines, and interference with the freedom of the seas was a 
breach of customary international law. The Court also stated 
the United States had violated provisions of the United 
Nations Charter, the OAS Charter, and the United States had 
acted against its promised obligations in its Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation which both the United 
States and Nicaragua had signed in 1956. 
The Court's Directions to the United States. The 
Court clearly stated United States military policies were not 
acceptable. As a result of U.S. violations of international 
law, the Court decided that: 
(1) •.• the United States of America is under 
a duty immediately to cease and to ref rain 
from all such acts as may constitute breaches 
of the foregoing legal obligations; 
(2) •.• the United States of America is under an 
obligation to make reparation to the Republic 
of Nicaragua for all injury caused to 
Nicaragua by the breaches of obligations ••• 
.•• the form and amount of such reparation 
failing agreement between the Pf5~ies, 
will be settled by the Court ••. 
114 
The Court also reminded both Nicaragua and the United States 
of their obligation "to seek a solution to their disputes by 
peaceful means in accordance with international law." 103 
Evaluation of U.S. Actions 
In its involvement with the mining of the Nicaraguan 
Harbor, the United States relied upon military policies 
rather than pursuing alternative strategies, such as settling 
problems through international legal channels. This U.S. em-
phasis upon military options has had a negative impact upon 
the international environment, even encouraging anarchical 
tendencies within the inter- national system. Further, a 
negative image which already was held by many countries to-
ward the United States was reinforced by these actions. 
Failure to Use the ICJ as an Alternative to Military 
Strategies. The United States argued that the ICJ had no 
jurisdiction regarding the mining of Nicaraguan harbors, that 
this was a political incident. And, soon after the American 
refusal to participate in the case, October 7, 1985--the 
U.S. Secretary of State, George Schultz, deposited the 
withdrawal from Article 36 (2) of the Statute of the 
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International court of Justice (the Optional Clause, 
voluntarily signed by the United States, granting the Court 
compulsory jurisdiction). 
Politics v. Justice. In rejecting the compulsory 
jurisdiction by the Court, the United States State Department 
insisted: 
The conflict in Central America, therefore, is not 
a narrow legal dispute; it is an inherently poltical 
problem that is not appropriate for judicial resolu-
tion. The conflict will be solved by political and104 diplomatic means--not through a judicial tribunal. 
However, as previously noted the United States has seemingly 
used diplomatic encounters with Nicaragua as opportunities to 
make further demands upon that country rather than truly 
attempting to seek an accomodation. And, in the very 
political setting of the U.N. Security Council, the United 
States used its veto power to block Nicaraguan initiatives. 
Yet, the United States claimed that the Court would not 
represent a fair, impartial standard of truth. Instead, the 
United States claimed that the ICJ had become politicized. 
It may be that the United Nations as an organization has 
become involved in international politics. Many analysts 
have regarded diplomatic statements as well as U.N. resolu-
tions as biased: •we have seen in the United Nations, in the 
last decade or more, how international organizations have 
become more politicized against the interests of Western 
democracies.• 105 And, the fear has existed that the Court 
might become as politicized as the other U.N. agencies. 
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Noting the U.S. fear of anti-Western sentiment American 
jurists have questioned: " ••• why should a superpower, in 
matters of essential national interest, ever subordinate its 
power of initiation to a system that it does not control and 
that may even be controlled by our enemies?" 106 It also 
seemed unfair for the Untied States to abide by such a 
possible politicized decision, when other nations of the 
world had been less accepting of the court's authority. For 
example, out of 159 member U.N. states, the United States was 
"one of only 44 states to have accepted the Court's compul-
sory jurisdiction."107 And regarding the sixteen judges 
who were to try the case, Nicaragua v. United States of 
America, "11 judges were from countries that do not accept 
the Court's compulsory jurisdiction."108 
The reality is that politics permeate the international 
environment, affecting even legal processes. Therefore, it 
would be an error to view politics and international law as 
separate. 109 Rather, the legal process is often utilized 
in a political manner: "The controverted versions of inter-
national law are parts of the weaponry of political warfare 
to support adversary claims, not ideas engaged in a contest 
for truth."llO And, "states generally conceive their 
disputes in fundamentally political terms."111 
Accordingly, it has been argued: 
Legal dimensions of international disputes are 
seen as an extension of the political character 
of these disputes. As political actors, states 
are understandably reticent about losing control 
of the disputes to which they are a party, and 
this means, in part, that states tend to adhere 
to their own conceptualization of disputes rather 
than accept a conce~t~alization presented from an 
alternative source. 
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There have been occasions when the politics asociated 
with the Court have been helpful in creating an atmosphere 
which fosters the eventual resolution of the international 
problem. For example, the court can serve political inter-
ests by slowing down hostilities, and giving opponents a 
chance to resolve their differences politically. Continued 
participation by the United States in the ICJ case: 
" •.• would at least have afforded time for a political settle-
ment of the controversy."113 The Court also can provide an 
opportunity for countries to publicize their views. Further, 
the threat of taking a state before the ICJ can also be used 
as a bargaining maneuver to pressure the other country to 
compromise. In this sense, "the mere presence of the Court 
provides one possible means of settling disputes in a 
peaceful fashion." 114 
There have even been occasions when the United States 
has benef itted from the relationship between law and 
politics. For example, the United States has manipulated 
legal arguments to serve its own political interests. During 
the Cuban Missile Crisis the United States desired to prevent 
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Soviet military supplies from reaching Cuba--but did not want 
to violate the freedom of the seas, causing an act of war. 
Analysts, writing about U.S. legal arguments concerning the 
establishment of a naval quarantine have written: "surely 
the American concern for international law was not a 
significant factor" in establishing a naval quarantine of 
Cuba; rather, "ambiguity in the law simply left room" for the 
United States to pursue this legal strategy. 115 And, dur-
ing the hostage crisis in 1980, the United States benefitted 
from the diplomatic climate--partly influenced by the ICJ--in 
which Iran felt compelled to release the American hos-
tages .116 The Court, "acting in a highly politicized 
environment," was able to influence events in a situation 
where the employment and threats of U.S. power had "failed 
utterly" to achieve results. 117 
Therefore, it is a misconception to distinguish between 
law and politics in a dichotomous fashion. Rather, it is 
necessary to understand the relationship betwen law and 
politics: 
••• law and lawfulness do not replace politics; 
they redirect politics by establishing an order-
liness to dispute resolution and a content to the 
dialogue of the dispute. It makes sense to think 
of the development of lawfulness as a movement 
along a continuum ranging from power-centered to 
principle-centered approaches to dispute resolution. 
Given the current state of international law, it is 
easy to see that the states of the w~f ad still have 
some way to go along this continuum. 
In light of the preceding arguments, it would not seem 
to have been in the best interests of the United States to 
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withdraw from the ICJ case involving Nicaragua. To many 
nations the U.S. response seemed extreme and reactive. The 
United States should have remembered that the ICJ had been 
useful to the United States in the past: " ••• we should not 
have walked away .•• "119 
Power v. Legality. By refusing the participate in a 
legal process and by withdrawing from the Optional Clause, it 
seemed as if the United States felt more secure relying on 
military policies to achieve its aims, rather than trusting 
in the adjudicative process. The United States actions 
seemed to indicate "that the U.S. interest is better 
protected when the nation relies on its own power than when 
it is submerged in a multilateral system which it cannot 
control."120 Soon after the United States withdrew from 
the Court case, President Reagan clearly indicated he would 
continue to rely upon military policies. In a news 
conference on February 22, 1985 he stated that until the 
Sandinista government says "uncle,n the goal of U.S. policy 
"is directly that of removing the 'present structure' of that 
government."121 This no doubt seemed a credible threat of 
force since the United States invaded Grenada soon after 
President Reagan had once described that government as 
consisting of "leftist thugs."122 
International legal agreements also do not seem to 
have restrained the United States from its military policies 
in Nicaragua. As noted, the ICJ found the United States had 
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violated provisions of the United Nations Charter, the OAS 
Charter, and its Friendship Treaty with Nicaragua. 
International jurists had hoped the development of supra-
national institutions and their accompanying international 
law would restrain the conduct of states in the world, but 
U.S. actions seem to indicate that "the Organizaton of 
American States is of only marginal importance if it inter-
feres with the U.S. policy of keeping Communist elites from 
gaining control of governments in the hemisphere."123 
(U.S. lack of support for any Contadora proposal that would 
accord legitimacy to leftist governments would seem further 
substantiation of this argument). 
Although there are some moralists who would always 
eschew the use of force, other analysts would insist that 
"the structure and stability of a community depend upon 
both law and power." 124 For example, the system of law 
can be regarded--not as a substitute for force--but as a 
"summary of the rules through which the society of nations 
deems it proper that the sanction of force be used to uphold 
the law."125 Some analysts even argue that coercion is 
legitimate: 
The nub of the matter is that the word 'coercion' 
has no normative significance; there is nothing 
illegal about coercion ••• Coercion is moral in 
all human relationships ••• so is cooperation. 
Indeed, every human relationship is some mixture 
of coercion and cooperation. So to say that a 
particular relationship is coercive f~6 to say nothing at all about its legitimacy. 
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Increase in System Instability. The problem with 
states resorting to military strategies is that this adds to 
the uncertainty in the international system. If inter-
national law seems to allow a certain amount of force to be 
used (as in self-help, self-defense, retaliation>, most 
states have still faced a basic problem regarding the amount 
of force needed to achieve state aims. And, "power-seeking 
alone" may not be "entirely productive of system 
stability."127 
An example of system instability is the area of 
customary law. It can be argued that recent U.S. military 
strategies are affecting international law in a confusing 
manner. The continued U.S. reliance upon military force may 
affect customary law by setting new standards for one state's 
intervention into the affairs of another state. 128 For 
example, the U.S. intervention in Grenada which ended the 
government that had just seized power through force, and the 
present support for the contras to remove the Sandinista 
regime in Nicaragua may be influencing a new rule of custom-
ary international laws and this new standard seemingly would 
allow states to intervene in other states possessing 
"improper" governments. 129 
In fact, since the end of World War II there has been 
an increase in state intervention. There has seemed to be a 
"new international concern regarding human rights."130 
Since World War II there has been a revolution 
in international legal affairs that permits states 
to intervene on behalf of insurgents within other 
states who are fighting against obvious regime 
terror. This revolution has removed a state's 
sovereignty regarding its own nationals from the 
claim of domestic jurisdiction whenever such 
trea~ment fail~1 to conform to particular normative requirements. 
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Even though •human rights" and •democratic arguments" 
are used by the United States to justify its activities in 
Nicaragua, Nicaragua can turn the same argument around to 
justify its support for insurgents in El Salvador. There-
fore, Nicaraguan intervention in El Salvador •may not be an 
instance of aggression at all.• Rather, following the same 
emphasis on human rights emphasized by Carter, Nicaraguan 
officials can argue their •actions toward El Salvador may 
qualify as 'humanitarian intervention.••132 In new 
customary law, then, it could be argued that: "Intervention 
can be both permissible and required.•133 Seen from this 
perspective, recent U.S. military policies may not only be 
influencing events in the Caribbean, they may be influencing 
the direction of international relations. And, the new 
direction of international behavior may be less ordered by 
restraint. Analysts have warned: •ay acting on the time-
dishonoured assumptions of political 'realism' the United 
States will enlarge the arena of worldwide instability.•134 
Another example of system instability regards "spheres 
of influence.• While rules of international behavior could 
not be considerd standardized, there are analysts who have 
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claimed that several years ago there seemed to be tacitly 
understood rules regarding superpowers and their regional 
conflicts. This understanding regarded spheres of influence, 
with the idea that each superpower could intervene in its own 
sphere of influence, but it would refrain from intervening in 
the other's area of dominance. However, this tacit under-
standing no longer holds true. In the present day, the 
interests of each power are now worldwide, as reflected by 
U.S. suport for Afghan rebels, and U.S.S.R. assistance to 
Nicaragua. At present, therefore: 
There is little consensus between the super-
powers on the principles that should be applied 
in negotiations on regional conflicts, and little 
consistency in the approach that each has taken 
in addressing the varous confl~5t situations in 
which it has become involved. 
Following international law and pursuing other 
order-seeking strategies could "do much to counteract the 
uncertainty" associated "with power-seeking strategies."136 
Specifically, the rules of international justice provide a 
general outline for promoting order-seeking strategies; 
therefore: 
••• it seems reasonable to place great weight 
on their importance in the course of a state's 
foreign policy-making. A state which fails to 
respect these international norms will incur 
difficulties in managing international uncer-137 tainty in the best interest of its citizenry. 
It would be in the best interest of the United States, 
then, to respect international customs and laws in order to 
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help reduce international tension. These rules of inter-
national justice provide a general outline for promoting 
order-seeking strategies; in fact, these strategies are 
essential for the effective management of international 
uncertainty. 138 Thucydides noted that •the strong do what 
they have power to do and the weak accept what they have to 
accept.•139 However, such behaviors only increase inter-
national uncertainty, with the risk of military strategies 
escalating. Observing this, Richard Falk has written: "The 
world may not have much time left in which to establish an 
effective system of world law.•140 
In spite of the inherent destruction associated with 
military confrontations in the international environment, it 
should be emphasized that the development of international 
order is an evolutionary process, one that will take time. 
Most analysts agree that the International Court of Justice 
is still "far from attaining a centralized judicial 
authority.•141 In fact, the international community can 
still be regarded at an early state of evolution. 142 In 
this regard, for international law to be effective there 
needs to be a general acceptance that •international law--and 
the ICJ in particular--are important contributors" to 
international stability; this acceptance is •fundamental to 
the evolution of an international legal system." 143 If 
states are to interact on the basis of lawfulness, the 
disputants will need to conceptualize their differences 
within a framework, or at least be willing •to fit the 
dispute under the control of legal rnachinery.• 144 Indeed: 
It is essential that the United States govern-
ment discover the practical value of legal self-
restraint and that we f ijislawful ways to promote 
our political interests. 
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The mere existence of law cannot itself create order in 
international relations, but predictability in international 
relations will increase if minimum degrees of law are 
observed--and international law may rationalize and extend 
whatever order exists. 146 There is a need to develop 
policies respecting international law--for the sake of 
managing international security, and ultimately for survival. 
•until we build a real international community, other forms 
of coercion will remain as instruments for the games nations 
play.•147 
The United States as a Villain. U.S. actions in 
Nicaragua have weakened the prestige of the United States 
itself, as well as weakening inernational law. As some 
analysts have argued, the U.S. withdrawal from the Optional 
Clause made the United States seem guilty of the Nicaraguan 
charges. It has been argued that the U.S. withdrawal from 
the Court is proof that the Reagan Administration had no real 
facts to support its assertion of Nicaraguan involvement in 
El Salvador, and no justificaion for U.S. military pol-
. . 148 1 h . d b d ic1es. Not on y can t e Unite States e portraye as 
guilty in the short run, but it has also been argued that 
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"in the long run, it deprives the United States of whatever 
moral superiority accrues from a continuous commitment to 
restraint and law." 149 For example, the United States had 
historically been committed to the idea of a higher law as 
codified in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitu-
tion1 but as a result of recent U.S. military policies the 
United States has even been characterized by one analyst as 
"becoming an outlaw in international politics."lSO 
According to this point of view, the United States only is 
concerned about international law when it is convenient for 
its own political purposes. For example, the United States 
has deplored the former government of Grenada and the 
Sandinista government, yet the United States tolerates human 
rights abuses in governments it favors, such as in Guatemala, 
Paraguay, or Chile. Rather than observing international 
legal norms, the United States can be viewed as following 
power-seeking motives in regard to Nicaragua: "United States 
'covert' tactics are purely counter-revolutionary operations 
that deliberately subordinate humanitarian concerns to the 
presumed interests of geopolitics.•151 Even members of the 
OAS have expressed concern about U.S. actions. In a November 
1986 meeting, the Peruvian delegate asked the OAS how it was 
possible that the United States "an OAS member state can 
legally approve financing, training, and arming an irregular 
army to attack another country that is also a member of the 
same organization."152 
~ 
OVERALL EVALUATION OF U.S. STRATEGIES 
IN NICARAGUA 
The historical overview of U.S. actions in Nicaragua 
points out the heavy reliance of the United States upon 
military strategies to manage political or economic uncer-
tainty. These policies have not eradicated the sources of 
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instability, and U.S. actions--as in support of Somoza-- have 
tended to support the status quo, preventing meaningful 
reforms in Nicaragua. Thus, in the long run, the problems 
causing instability have continued to fester. 
In spite of American policies a Marxist/socialist 
government has developed which the United States has regarded 
with disfavor. Aside from deploring a lack of true democracy 
and human rights, the United States has regarded the 
Sandinistas as a destabilizing factor in the Caribbean Basin 
area. The Reagan Administration particularly tended to view 
developments in Nicaragua from a Cold War perspective, 
seeing the Sandinistas as a front for communist agitation 
within the region. The Reagan Administration's current 
approach to Nicaragua continues to rely upon military 
strategies--rather than exploring alternative approaches to 
resolution--such as through the Contadora process or through 
ICJ resolution. 
Through its military strategies the United States has 
attempted to alter Nicaragua's state behavior. A variety of 
military strategies have been pursued in Nicaragua. For 
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example, shows of force have been conducted over recent 
years. Large naval displays have been regarded as "gunboat 
diplomacy" by some analysts because the scope and size of 
recent maneuvers, such as Big Pine II, would suggest that 
they were meant to have a coercive threat. Threatening 
actions were backed by threatening statements from Reagan, 
Haig, Kirkpatrick and other top administration officials. 
The location of naval task forces off both coasts of 
Nicaragua and of U.S. troops near the Nicaraguan border could 
also be construed as actions designed to make the verbal 
threats more credible. U.S. actions have seemed to promise 
this. Over time, U.S. sponsored military activities have 
escalated. In fact, there were so many military personnel 
involved in the Big Pine II exercises that this has been 
regarded by some as no less than a temporary stationing of 
U.S. troops in the area. Just as there came to be military 
advisors and citizens involved in this area, there was also 
an increase in the amount of U.S. finances spent on these 
activities. When congressional policies were designed to 
restrain U.S. military strategies, secret arms deals, secret 
Swiss accounts, and private donations by private citizens and 
other foreign leaders temporarily financed the U.S. supported 
contra effort. United States strategies also seemed to have 
been used as a threat based upon the assumption that the ex-
pectation of continued violence would "get the wanted be-
h . .153 H . 1 . . avior. owever, mi itary strategies have also been 
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used as a bargaining tool. The United States has suggested 
that its support of the contras is designed to foster change 
in the Nicaraguan government; presumbly enough suitable 
changes by Nicaragua would affect U.S. actions, alleviating 
the necessity of U.S. support for the contras and their 
U.S. training camps. 
And, if the Nicaraguans didn't change their political 
positions, it was hoped that the U.S. military policies would 
lead to the fall of the Nicaraguan government. In 1983 the 
CIA Director Casey predicted in congressional testimony that 
the contras stood a good chance of def eating the Sandinistas 
by the end of the year. 154 Other Administration officials 
hoped continued covert activities would pressure the 
Sandinistas to infringe on civil liberties; at the least this 
would diminish the appeal of Nicaragua as a model for other 
countries to follow. 155 Still other officials hoped: 
.•• that a threatened Sandinista government will 
bring itself down by further repressing its internal 
opposition, thereby strengthening the determination 
of moderate forces to resist. If 1 ~gat happens ••• then the Sandinistas will fall... . 
To this date, U.S. military policies have not seemed 
very effective in achieving U.S. objectives. Nicaragua has 
admitted having social, economic, and political problems--but 
has seemed determined not to succumb to U.S. pressures. 
Contra activities not only have been of doubtful value, but 
U.S. support of the contras has been increasingly criticized, 
both at home and abroad. 
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U.S. policies in Nicaragua need to be recalculated and 
alternatives to military strategies need to be explored. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
GENERALIZATIONS 
Although states have pursued order-seeking strategies 
at times, they have often seemed to follow advice given to 
the prince by Machiavelli--that force is often necessary to 
achieve state goals. While moralists and realists have 
debated over the appropriateness of force, states never-
theless have continued to employ or threaten military 
actions. These policies appear to have been based upon the 
assumption that the threat or even the use of limited 
violence is useful in projecting state power to alter the 
behavior of other states. 1 Further, these military 
strategies have been considered more effective methods to 
communicate the resolve of a state than merely verbalizing 
state intentions. 2 In fact, many analysts have viewed 
military strategies as part of a communication process--as an 
influence, bargaining, or coercive attempt to alter the 
behavior of other states. 3 
The use of U.S. military strategies as a means to 
alter state behavior has been evident in the Caribbean Basin, 
with the United States pursuing a variety of military 
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policies. Some policies have attempted to alter the behavior 
of other states, but to do so without engaging in physical 
violence. These policies include conducting naval maneuvers, 
as a "show-of-force" to a nearby state which the United 
States wished to influence, as when the Marblehead was sent 
to the coast of El Salvador to influence a ceasefire agree-
OOnt. In some instances, U.S. policies have not actually 
involved using force against another state; but the threat of 
using such force has made the military policies seem 
coercive. For example, official statements by U.S. policy-
makers and large naval maneuvers such as the Big Pine II 
exercises seem to have been intended to threaten Nicaragua to 
alter its state behavior. In other instances the United 
States apparently has assumed that limited violence is useful 
to project state power. For example, U.S. troops intervened 
in Haiti in 1915 to secure strategic and economic control of 
the area; U.S. troops intervened in the Dominican Republic 
from 1916-1924, establishing martial law and a U.S. military 
government; and in 1917 U.S. marines intervened in Cuba, 
putting down strikes and protecting U.S. property. Another 
strategic policy of the United States has been categorized as 
"coercive diplomacy." United States strategy during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, has been characterized as "coercive 
diplomacy." In spite of the high level of risk during this 
crisis U.S. policy has been conceptualized as "a persuasion 
attempt rather than pure coercion." 4 However, the Bay of 
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Pigs invasion has been regarded as definitely coercive--a 
more "crude use of force." 5 These policies of using force 
suggest that the United States has viewed limited violence as 
useful to influence, threaten, coerce, or bargain with a 
country in order to alter that state's behavior. 
INFERENCES 
First Impressions 
In the short term it might seem that the U.S. military 
policies in the Caribbean Basin have been successful. Such 
policies have been used to influence, threaten, coerce, or 
bargain with a country to alter its state behavior. 
There are many examples to illustrate this point. For 
instance military strategies have enabled the United States 
to protect American economic interests; and the United States 
has remained the hegemonic power in the area. The United 
States has sponsored groups who successfully overthrew the 
Arbenz government in Guatemala; prevented a communist govern-
ment from coming to power in the Dominican Republic; and 
halted the increased influence of the Soviets during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. More recently, United States military 
action prevented a communist government from solidifying its 
political power in Grenada. Military strategies are cur-
renty being pursued with regard to Nicaragua; and there is 
some evidence to indicate that Nicaragua did respond to U.S. 
military policies by becoming more accepting of the Contadora 
negotiation process. It plausibly could be argued that 
restrained Cuban and Soviet support for Nicaragua is 




A more in-depth analysis suggests that first 
impressions regarding the U.S. use of force are not entirely 
accurate. Although many military strategies have seemed 
useful at the moment, these same policies have presented 
problems over a longer period of time. 
United States military intervention has particularly 
been resented. As previously noted, in 1915 the United 
States marines imposed martial law in Haiti to ensure a 
stable environment; yet a growing nationalist movement 
opposed this action, leading to a tense political situation 
and to a demand for the withdrawal of U.S. troops--which was 
agreed to in 1934. In Panama, the United States was influ-
ential in establishing an increased military presence in the 
area during World War II, but U.S. actions produced 
"anti-Yankee nationalism." Other resentments from varied 
U.S. invasions have continued to affect u.s.-caribbean 
relations. 
There also has been a concern regarding whether a 
military strategy was the only policy that could have been 
employed. For example, Senator Fulbright opposed U.S. ac-
tions in Guatemala. He argued that such a military policy 
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did not represent the best foreign policy and that 
U.S. reliance upon military strategies prevented other 
political options from being chosen. This same argument has 
been applied to U.S. actions in Grenada and Nicaragua. And, 
analysts who have reviewed the Bay of Pigs invasion have felt 
that political options were not fully explored because 
policymakers relied upon a previous Guatemalan covert plan 
which seemed applicable to the Cuban invasion. 
It has also been suggested that the United States is 
employing military strategies to the degree that order in the 
international community is threatened by U.S. actions. In 
fact, the United States has come to be regarded by some 
critics as a state that only follows international law when 
it seems convenient for it to do so. For example, U.S. ac-
tions in the Dominican Republic were ratified after the fact 
by the O.A.S. Or, in the case of the Grenada invasion, the 
United States responded to a request from several Eastern 
Caribbean states, but not from a majority of states as re-
quired by the treaty. Such actions have been regarded 
unfavorably by the international community as demonstrated by 
various U.N. resolutions, speeches, and even by security 
council votes and debates. Allies, even in the O.A.S., crit-
icized the United States for its actions in Grenada. The ICJ 
also stated that certain U.S. actions in connection with the 
mining of the Nicaraguan harbor were in opposition to inter-
national law. It has been argued that the United States 
145 
further indicated its disregard for international law by 
refusing to allow the matter to be resolved through inter-
national legal dispute processes--claiming instead that the 
issue was a political matter. 
Just as the United States has seemed to disregard 
international law, it has also seemed to bypass international 
organizations or regional groups which could help in dispute 
resolution. It has seemed--especially in the Nicaraguan 
case--that the United States has preferred to rely upon 
military strategies rather than to trust in a resolution 
process that it could not control. The United States has not 
appeared tolerant of accepting political or economic diver-
sity within the region. For example, a previous intimation 
by Mexico--that it might be possible for a socialist country 
to peacefully exist with its neighbors as long as it made no 
attempt to export its revolutionary ideas--has reinforced the 
suspicion of the United States toward regional solutions. 
ASSUMPTIONS CHALLENGED 
Assumption #1 
The assumption that forceful policies are useful 
pragmatic strategies needs to be challenged. As noted, pol-
icies which seemed successful in the short term often caused 
problems in the future. It has been pointed out that these 
U.S. policies have caused criticism for the United States. 
It is difficult to accept that unpopular policies are 
successful. 
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U.S. actions often have disturbances within the 
international community. This is a particularly alarming 
fact. It was noted earlier that the international environ-
ment has been characterized as being anarchic, with risk-
taking having been a common pattern of international rela-
tions. In fact, analysts have argued that a state might 
weigh power-seeking or order-seeking strategies to calculate 
which strategy would pay the greatest dividends in any part-
icular instance6 Yet, these same analysts have pointed out 
that power-seeking by one state may increase power-seeking 
strategies in other states. 7 If, as also argued by these 
analysts, the state has a "moral responsibility" to manage 
international uncertainty in the best interests of its 
citizens, then it would seem the U.S. reliance upon military 
strategies needs to be reevaluated. 
It does seem that U.S. actions have created more 
uncertainty within the international community. It has been 
noted that previously accepted patterns of interaction have 
become less clear due to U.S. military strategies. For 
example, recent U.S. support of the contras has suggested 
that other states could claim they were intervening to change 
a repressive government. "Backyards" or spheres of influence 
seem to be less clearly deliniated--with the U.S. aiding 
Afghanistan rebels~ the u.s.s.R. aiding the Sandinistas. 
Therefore, it is not clear that military strategies are 
useful over a long period of time if they significantly 
increase the international uncertainty in the world. 
Assumption #2 
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The assumption that forceful military strategies can 
be designed in a calculated, carefully designed manner to 
influence, bargain or coerce also needs to be reconsidered. 
As evidenced by the historical case studies, neither the 
success nor the possible failures of policies can be abso-
lutely forseen. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the 
potential for serious escalation certainly existed as the 
Soviet ships approached the u.s.-established naval quarantine 
line. The Bay of Pigs invasion also involved the potential 
for increasing international uncertainty. After the un-
successful invasion attempt, the possibility for escalation 
existed. For example, United States policymakers could have 
pursued guerilla warfare in Cuba. Currently, the U.S. sup-
port of the contras risks widening the conflict in the 
Caribbean area. 
The various case studies have suggested that there is 
no guarantee a military policy will have a particular effect. 
As Bernholz has pointed out: the international system is 
not perfectly predictable or fully controllable. 8 There-
fore, military strategies represent serious risks and in-
crease international uncertainty. As Etheredge has argued: 
" ••• analytical brilliance and technical rationality are 
neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for peace." 9 
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Furthermore, present American foreign policies ignore 
changes in the international system which have markedly 
diminished the ability of the United States to control 
events: 
Power to control, or even to dictate, 
internal political processes within Latin 
American nations has been weakened irrevers-
ibly by the natural historical processes of 
growth, the integration of nation-states on 
the continent, and the release of pent-up 
political, social and economic aspiprations 
of the vast majority of the populations in 
many of these countries. The time has long 
passed when the United States could cavalierly 
send tr£8PS to install regimes of its own 
liking. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The United States foreign policy needs to stress the 
development of policies rather than heavily relying upon 
military actions. Since it would seem that U.S. strategies 
often have been dysfunctional rather than utilitarian, the 
United States needs to recalculate its policies, devising 
state behaviors that will not only obtain short-term goals 
but which will be effective over a longer period of time. 
Analysts have suggested a wide variety of alternatives 
to current American policies. It has been suggested that 
observing international law and pursuing other order-seeking 
behaviors could "do much to counteract the uncertainty" 
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associated with power-seeking. 11 Other analysts have 
stressed the poverty and instability of the Caribbean area; 
and have suggested that U.S. supported reform efforts could 
create a more economically well balanced--possibly a more 
democratic--environment which could create more stability in 
the area. Still others have suggested that the United States 
needs to re-evaluate its stated reasons for intervention. 
Perhaps the verbalized assumption that communism is dangerous 
to U.S. security needs to be re-calculated; perhaps the 
United States needs to be more accepting of socialist regimes 
in the Caribbean as long as they do not try to foment 
revolution in other areas. 
Regardless of the specific policies devised, it is 
clear that to manage international uncertainty in the best 
interests of its citizens, the United States needs to pursue 
alternative strategies. The warning suggested by this study 
is clear: "Long term success in the application of military 
strategies is not easily achieved; disaster is always a 
single bad decision away.• 12 
Further, as has been pointed out, a substantial degree 
of general consent is needed in the international system. 
"The exercise of power alone cannot lead to a stable 
international order."13 
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